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ABSTRACT: The last few years have seen a renewed push to constitutionalize sex
equality in the United States. A generation after the federal Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) failed to be ratified by the requisite number of states, the
ERA is on the platform of the 2017 Women's March on Washington. Oregon
added a sex equality guarantee to its state constitution in 2014, joining 22 state
constitutions and most constitutions around the world. Feminist coalitions,
Hollywood celebrities, and members of Congress are vocally endorsing an ERA
revival. Why is an ERA desired now, when judges have interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit sex discrimination? Today's ERA proponents
want the Constitution to do something about women's continued economic
disadvantages, the unfair treatment of pregnant women and mothers in the
workplace, women's underrepresentation in leadership positions, and the
inadequate responses to violence against women. Yet, the legal functions they
attribute to the proposed constitutional guarantee-such as strict scrutiny for sex
distinctions-are unlikely to respond to these post-industrial problems of gender
inequality. Nonetheless, this Article proposes a new vision of the ERA's legal
function, drawing on the experience of global constitutionalism. Focusing on
countries that adopted constitutional amendments on sex equality after the
ERA's failure, this Article shows how the constitutional right to sex equality can
promote gender balance in positions of political and economic power, combat
practices that disadvantage mothers in the workplace, and shift family care
policies to increase fathers' participation in childcare. In Europe, constitutional
I Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, jsuk@yu.edu. Many thanks to the participants
in faculty workshops at Chicago-Kent, Cardozo, University of Cincinnati, and Columbia Law Schools,
and the Comparative Constitutional Law Roundtable at James Madison's Montpelier, and students in
Constitutional Law at LUISS-Guido Carli in Rome and Hunter College High School, for reading and
reacting to earlier drafts. Thanks also to the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. and the ABA
and Second Circuit institutes for high school teachers for inspiring and engaging this paper. I am especially
grateful to Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Mathilde Cohen, Erin Delaney, Rosalind Dixon, Liz Emens, David
Fontana, Jamal Greene, St6phanie Hennette-Vauchez, Vicki Jackson, Olatunde Johnson, Jeremy Kessler,
David Law, Ruth Rubio-Marin, Serena Mayeri, Ralf Michaels, Russell Miller, Henry Monaghan, Douglas
NeJaime, Giovanni Piccirilli, Reva Siegel, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Susan Sturm, Mila Versteeg, and
Joan Williams for their insights, criticisms and encouragement. Thanks also to Emily Foster and Shira
Sandier for research and editorial assistance.
Copyright © 2017 by the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
sex equality amendments since the 1990s go beyond outlawing sex
discrimination; these new amendments engender and legitimize legislative
efforts to disrupt the traditional gendered division of roles in the family and
public spheres. Constitutional courts in Germany and France have construed
these amendments as articulating actual equality between women and men as a
principle by which the constitutional order's legitimacy is measured, rather than
as an individually enforced right. In the United States, there are some synergies
between European constitutional innovations in gender equality and public
policies that are emerging piecemeal at the state and local level. States are
leading the way in legislating pregnant worker fairness, paid parental leave, and
childcare. A motherhood movement and a wide range of actors from across the
political spectrum are driving these new laws. These developments can shape an
updated vision of constitutional sex equality for the United States. Taking
inspiration from global constitutionalism, and recognizing the potential of state
constitutionalism, this Article identifies the emerging new infrastructure of social
reproduction-rather than antidiscrimination-as the normative core for the
twenty-first-century ERA.
IN TRO D UCTIO N ................................................................................................ 383
I. THE ERA R EVIVAL ...................................................................................... 386
A. A Popular Constitutional Movement .............................................. 386
1. P ay Inequity ............................................................................. 388
2. Unfair Treatment of Pregnant Workers and Mothers .............. 389
3. Violence Against W om en ........................................................ 390
4. Women's Underrepresentation in Leadership ......................... 391
5. Post-Industrial Gender Inequalities ......................................... 391
B. The Mismatch Between ERA Politics and Law ............................. 393
II. SEX EQUALITY IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM ...................................... 399
A. Sex Equality Provisions and Global Gender Gap Rankings ........... 399
B . A ntidiscrim ination .......................................................................... 402
C . Substantive E quality ....................................................................... 402
D . M aternity Protection ....................................................................... 405
III. FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION TO ACTUAL EQUALITY: Two JURISDICTIONS
WITH RECENT AMENDMENTS ............................................................... 407
A . G erm any ......................................................................................... 408
1. The 1950s: Antidiscrimination and Traditional Gender Roles 408
2. Heightened Scrutiny for Sex Distinctions from the 1970s to the
19 9 0 s ...................................................................................... 4 0 9
3. The "Actual Implementation of Equal Rights": Amendment,
Affirmative Action, and Disparate Impact ............................ 412
[Vol. 28:381
2017] An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century 383
4. The Constitutional Rights Norm of Equal Rights: A Focus on
E qual Parenting ...................................................................... 4 14
B . F ran ce .............................................................................................. 4 18
1. Formal Constitutional Equality in 1982 ................................... 419
2. Feminist Mobilization: From Antidiscrimination to Parity
D em ocracy ............................................................................. 420
3. Legislating "Real Equality". .................................................... 421
4. Not a Fundamental Right: Parity as Principle ......................... 423
IV. BRINGING GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM HOME ...................................... 426
A. Completing the Revolution in Social Reproduction ....................... 426
B. The American Infrastructure of Social Reproduction in the States 429
1. Pregnancy Accomm odation ..................................................... 430
2. Paid Parental L eave ................................................................. 431
3. Childcare and Education for Children of Breadwinners .......... 432
4. Structuring Work for Coequal Parents and Caregivers ........... 433
C. The Significance of Constitutional Commitment ........................... 436
D. Towards a New Constitutional Consensus ..................................... 441
C O N CLU SION ................................................................................................... 443
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution was proposed
almost a century ago. The ERA would have guaranteed sex equality. A
generation after the ERA met its demise in 1982, a new movement led by
members of Congress, feminist coalitions, and Hollywood celebrities is now
reviving the push for the ERA. Since 1982, the Supreme Court has applied
heightened scrutiny to sex distinctions, invalidated laws based on gender
stereotypes, and recognized the right to same-sex marriage. Meanwhile, in
November 2014, Oregon became the twenty-third state in the United States to
add a sex equality provision to its state constitution.' And, in the intervening
century since the ERA entered into American constitutional consciousness, sex
equality provisions have been added to many other constitutions throughout the
world, notably in European social democratic states. These developments should
enrich and change our thinking about whether the ERA is desirable today. They
should broaden our imagination about what constitutional sex equality can
accomplish.
This Article reconceptualizes the ERA for the twenty-first century as the
legal infrastructure of gender equality. The ERA that was adopted by Congress
in 1972 primarily prohibited discrimination on grounds of sex by government.
1. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 46.
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But a new constitutional amendment on sex equality ought to go beyond
nondiscrimination. For women to gain fully equal status in post-industrial
democracies, basic institutions need to be redesigned to alter the status quo where
women and men play different and unequal roles in producing the next
generation of citizens. Social reproduction-the mechanisms by which a society
reproduces itself to enable its survival beyond the present generation of
citizens-is a concern for constitutional law. A constitution constitutes a polity
that lives on beyond the lifetimes of the constitution-makers. Constitutions
contain implicit or explicit plans for how the citizens who make up that polity
will be made and raised. For hundreds of years, the survival of modem societies
depended on gender-differentiated, unequal roles in economic, political, and
family life. A constitutional commitment to gender equality thus must include a
commitment to new institutions that enable the polity to continue in the absence
of gender-unequal roles. An Equal Rights Amendment for the twenty-first
century is best conceptualized as a right to egalitarian institutions rather than a
right against discrimination. Proposing an Equal Rights Amendment today can
reorient the way we think about constitutional rights more broadly, and the
function of constitutional rights in our legal and economic system.
Instead of using the constitutional right to sex equality as a shield against
sexist government action, this Article proposes that a constitutional guarantee of
sex equality be approached as a foundation for federal and state governmental
initiatives to build gender-equal infrastructures. We need not start from scratch;
we can take inspiration and ideas from other constitutional orders around the
world that have begun to move in this direction through the process of
constitutional change. New legislation and government programs that reduce
women's disadvantage have a constitutional valence, due in part to new sex
equality amendments added to constitutions in recent memory. Not all
constitutional sex equality clauses around the world have bite, but it is
worthwhile to closely engage those that do. Sex equality amendments enacted in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in Europe provide examples of
constitutional amendments undertaken with consciousness of post-industrial
manifestations of gender inequality. They should help us think about the goals
of constitutional sex equality in the United States today.
In the United States, the failure to ratify the ERA led legal feminists to
pursue change in the 1980s and 1990s through the Equal Protection Clause and
anti-discrimination statutes. Their successes produced a sex equality
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act that many legal scholars regard as a "de facto ERA." Thus, it is widely
believed that a formal constitutional amendment in the form of an ERA, if
adopted today, would not make a significant difference to the law of sex equality,
and that it would be merely symbolic. This Article challenges this understanding.
A twenty-first-century ERA can significantly disrupt the remaining
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manifestations of gender inequality, such as pay inequity; women's economic
disadvantages related to pregnancy, maternity, and caregiving; women's
underrepresentation in positions of economic and political power; and violence
against women. But in order to do so, the legal imagination of the ERA would
have to stretch beyond strict scrutiny, disparate impact, and other familiar
antidiscrimination tools to which ERA proponents continue to cling. European
countries have intervened more robustly on pay inequity, parental leave, early
childhood education, and women's equal representation in leadership, and this
Article explores the relationships between these interventions and the countries'
constitutional amendments.
Part I describes the current ERA revival effort, detailing arguments in legal
and political discourse about why an ERA is needed now. Part I points out the
mismatch between the early twenty-first-century problems that concern today's
ERA movement, and the legal solutions that the proponents believe the ERA
offers. Identifying this mismatch is important in overcoming some of the
resistance to the ERA and in revealing the legal potential of the gender equality
right.
In that vein, Part II turns to global constitutionalism. ERA proponents often
note that the vast majority of the world's constitutions explicitly guarantee sex
equality. Part II raises the questions of whether, why, and how sex equality in
foreign constitutions should matter to the U.S. trajectory. In international
rankings of gender equality, the United States does better than most countries
with sex equality in their constitutions, but we still lag behind many European
countries. Most European countries have guaranteed sex equality in their
constitutions since World War II, and several others amended their constitutions
in the past twenty-five years, responding to the more recent manifestations of
gender inequality that most concern today's ERA movement. Part II identifies
three types of constitutional provisions in global constitutionalism that concern
women's status: nondiscrimination guarantees that name sex as a prohibited
ground; additional sex equality provisions that refer to some form of substantive
equality (such as "actual" equality or a duty to promote women's equal access to
positions of power); and motherhood clauses, which declare the state's duty to
protect mothers.
Part III zeroes in on two countries that amended their constitutions to clarify
the meaning of sex equality after the United States' ERA failed in 1982:
Germany and France. In Germany and France, amendments in 1994 and 1999
transformed constitutional sex equality-from formal to substantive, and from
an individual constitutional right to a structural principle that legitimizes the
constitutional political order. These amendments were primarily concerned with
affirming the legitimacy of state efforts to promote women's advancement in
politics and employment, but they have also been broadly construed to speak to
the role of the state in transforming men and women's social functions in the
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family. Constitutional change occurred through litigation, amendment, and
legislation invoking the sex equality provision.
Part IV draws out some common threads between global gender
constitutionalism and state constitutional law in the United States. Almost half
of the United States' state constitutions have provisions that explicitly commit to
sex equality or non-discrimination on grounds of sex. Some state courts have
interpreted these provisions as requiring strict scrutiny, disparate impact liability,
and equal treatment by non-state actors. In addition, states have begun to adopt
legislation on paid parental leave, pregnancy accommodation, equal pay, and
other policy issues at the core of the ERA movement's agenda. While these
legislative initiatives have not been framed in legal or political discourse as
enforcements of the ERA, Part IV proposes a constitutional framing. State courts
have not interpreted state ERAs to go much beyond federal equal protection sex
jurisprudence, but their legislatures are adopting paid parental leave regimes,
rights to early childhood education, equal pay laws that reach beyond pay
discrimination, and laws that protect flexible work arrangements. Whatever their
purpose, these laws are forming the twenty-first-century infrastructure of social
reproduction: they enable children to be raised without depending on the
incumbent unequal infrastructure of female child-rearers and male breadwinners.
The developing infrastructure responds to the shared concerns of twenty-first-
century women's constitutionalism in post-industrial societies around the world.
Part V considers what is gained and lost by giving constitutional status to the
new gender-equal form of social reproduction required to achieve post-industrial
sex equality. A constitutional amendment can give coherence to these piecemeal
legislative initiatives, and nudge lawmakers, lawyers, and judges to build the
other necessary pieces of this infrastructure.
I. THE ERA REVIVAL
A. A Popular Constitutional Movement
ERA bills have been reintroduced in Congress every year for the last few
years with the sponsorship of Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney. 2 New
discussions of the Equal Rights Amendment have come up, not only in Congress 3
2. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 16, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 52, 114th Cong. (2015).
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4 5
and political rallies, but in conversations with Supreme Court Justices, a new
documentary6 and book by advocates, 7 and even in Oscar acceptance speeches.
8
The Guiding Vision and Definition of Principles for the January 2017 Women's
March on Washington includes "an all-inclusive Equal Rights Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution." 9 In a recent interview at the National Press Club, Justice
Ginsburg was asked what amendment she would add to the Constitution. She
replied:
If I could choose an amendment to add to this Constitution, it would be
the Equal Rights Amendment.... It means that women are people equal
in stature before the law. That's a fundamental constitutional principle.
I think we have achieved that through legislation, but legislation could
be repealed, it can be altered. I mentioned Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, and the first one was the Equal Pay Act. But that principle belongs
in our Constitution and is in every constitution written since the Second
World War. So I would like my granddaughters, when they pick up the
Constitution, to see that that notion, that women and men are persons of
equal stature, I'd like them to see that that is a basic principle of our
society.
10
In 2014, many women's organizations, including the National Organization
for Women (NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus, and Feminist
Majority, formed the ERA Coalition, devoted to passage and ratification of the
ERA.
11
4. There were ERA rallies in front of the Supreme Court in July 2014 and on the West Lawn of the
Capitol in September 2014. See Feminist Leaders and Activists Rally for the Equal Rights Amendment,
FEMINIST NEWSWIRE (Jul. 24, 2014), https://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2014/07/24/feminist-leaders-
and-activists-rally-for-the-equal-rights-amendment; Nicole Gaudiano, Fight to ratify Equal Rights
Amendment draws new interest, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/09/12/equal-rights-amendment-rally/I 5508713/.
5. See Justices Scalia and Ginsburg on the First Amendment and Freedom, C-SPAN (Apr. 17,
2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?318884-1/conversation-justices-scalia-ginsburg-2014 [hereinafter
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg].
6. EQUAL MEANS EQUAL: THE DEFINITIVE DOCUMENTARY FILM ABOUT THE STATUS OF WOMEN
N AMERICA (Kamala Lopez 2016), http://equalmeansequal.com/.
7. JESSICA NEUWIRTH, EQUAL MEANS EQUAL: WHY THE TIME FOR AN EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT Is Now (2015).
8. When Patricia Arquette won an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actress in 2015, she ended
her acceptance speech with the following: "To every woman who gave birth to every taxpayer and citizen
of this nation, we have fought for everybody else's equal rights. It's our time to have wage equality once
and for all and equal rights for women in the United States." See Lauren Moraski, Patricia Arquette gives
rousing Oscars speech, CBS NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patricia-arquette-
gives-rousing-oscars-speech/.
9. J. Bob Alotta et al., Guiding Vision and Definition of Principles, WOMEN'S MARCH ON WASH.
(2017), https://www.womensmarch.com/principles.
10. See Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, supra note 5.
11. See Jessica Ravitz, The New Women Warriors: Reviving the Fight for Equal Rights, CNN (Apr.
16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/us/new-womens-equal-rights-movement/index.html; see also
Our Members, ERA COALITION, http://www.eracoalition.org/ourmembers.php (last visited Aug. 13,
2016).
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The current ERA movement is primarily concerned with the difficulties that
women continue to face in the United States, despite the fact that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to prohibit sex
discrimination, and many statutes also prohibit sex discrimination. These
problems include pay inequity, violence against women, employers' failures to
accommodate pregnancy, and the general lack of public support for child-
rearing, which negatively affects working mothers. The movement is also
concerned with women's underrepresentation in positions of political and
economic power. ERA proponents argue that putting sex equality into the text of
our Constitution, in the form of the ERA, would have a positive impact on all
these fronts.
In providing an overview of ERA proponents' understanding of these
problems, I rely on a few main sources: press releases by the members of
Congress who have supported the ERA, the ERA Coalition President Jessica
Neuwirth's book Equal Means Equal,12 Kamala Lopez's documentary film by
the same name, 13 and documents available on the ERA Coalition's website.
14
Meryl Streep sent Neuwirth's book to every member of Congress in 2015.
Kamala Lopez's documentary presents itself as the rallying cry of the new ERA
movement, and was produced by Patricia Arquette, whose Oscar speech and
media appearances have called for the ERA. 15 Equal Means Equal has been
shown at Women's Equality Day events across the country, including at a
gathering of UN Women.
1. Pay Inequity
The persistence of women's unequal pay, suggesting the inadequacy of
existing antidiscrimination and equal pay laws, is a central issue for the ERA
campaign. Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney has invoked the Supreme Court's
2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes 16 as an example of a problem that the ERA
would address: "The Wal-Mart case decided by the Supreme Court... is a classic
example of how far attitudes must still come. The facts of the case support the
view that over a million women were systematically denied equal pay by the
world's largest employer."1 7 The question in Wal-Mart was whether all the
women who had been denied promotions at Wal-Mart could proceed in one class
action lawsuit, despite the varying facts surrounding their claims. The Supreme
12. NEUWIRTH, supra note 7.
13. EQUAL MEANS EQUAL, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Why We Need an Equal Rights Amendment, ERA COALITION& FUND FOR WOMEN'S
EQUALITY, http://www.eracoalition.org/files/whyweneedtheERA.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
15. Supra note 8.
16. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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Court answered in the negative. The Court's decision to de-certify the class was
taken by ERA proponents as a symptom of U.S. law's inadequate commitment
to eradicating pay and promotion practices that disadvantage women. In the
movement's documentary film, Equal Means Equal, the Wal-Mart case, along
with the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear,18 are invoked as
evidence of the need for the ERA.
2. Unfair Treatment of Pregnant Workers and Mothers
ERA proponents also highlight employers' unfair treatment of pregnant
workers, which is often permitted by law. The documentary Equal Means Equal
recounts the stories of pregnant women who asked to carry water bottles on the
job, to be relieved of their duty to lift heavy objects, or for other accommodations
from their employers. Many of these women were fired or involuntarily put on
unpaid leave. The failure to accommodate pregnant workers is not necessarily
illegal. As the recent Supreme Court case Young v. UPS affirmed, pregnant
workers are entitled to accommodations only to the extent that the employer
accommodates other workers similarly situated in their incapacity to work.
19
Employers are not required to give any special accommodations to pregnant
workers that they do not give to other disabled workers, and employers may deny
pregnant workers accommodations that they provide to a subset of disabled
workers for special reasons.
ERA proponents want the law to require the accommodation of pregnant
workers, and they believe the ERA could play a role in doing so. As Neuwirth
says, "The ERA could create a right to sex equality that in the context of
pregnancy recognizes that women and men have equal rights to work and have
children at the same time." 20 Neuwirth suggests that the Equal Rights
Amendment "could change the legal landscape.... What this might mean in the
context of pregnancy is recognition ... that women and men have biological
differences and that the workplace cannot be structured solely around the biology
of men, ignoring the biology of women. ' 21 Properly construed, the ERA would
make it:
impossible to consider the accommodation of pregnancy in the
workplace as any kind of "preferential treatment" or discrimination
18. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. Although Ledbetter was reversed by a
statute that makes each discriminatory paycheck a separate adverse employment action, the fact that the
Supreme Court ruled against Ledbetter under Title VII is invoked as evidence of the need for a more
robust expression of commitment to sex equality.
19. Young v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1350 (2015) ("We doubt that Congress
intended to grant pregnant workers an unconditional most-favored-nation status.").
20. NEUWIRTH, supra note 7, at 34.
21. Id. at49.
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against men. Rather, the failure to accommodate pregnancy would be
rightly recognized as a form of discrimination against women that
disadvantages them in the workplace and violates their right to sex
equality.
22
3. Violence Against Women
Another major theme of the ERA movement is the persistence of violence
against women-and the law's inadequate response to it. The film Equal Means
Equal spends a significant amount of time documenting violence against women.
One type of legal injustice is the harsh criminal punishment of battered women
who kill their batterers in alleged self-defense. When a battered woman's self-
defense argument does not succeed, even in the face of ample evidence of the
man's past repeated violence against the woman, the woman may be sentenced
to decades of imprisonment. The film suggests that law enforcement
inadequately prevents, prosecutes, and punishes violence against women. By
contrast, law enforcement excessively prosecutes and punishes women who
attempt to prevent or end the violence that they have suffered.
Similarly, government does too little to prevent or punish the sex trafficking
of young girls, which persists throughout the world, including in the United
States. The documentary tells the stories of teenage girls who have been
kidnapped and forced into prostitution. Some of them have been prosecuted for
prostitution, while their pimps have managed to continue their activities on the
streets, escaping prosecution and punishment.
The book Equal Means Equal also devotes some attention to violence
against women, including the Supreme Court's decisions related to the issue. In
2000, the Supreme Court struck down the private civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 23 The Court held that Congress lacked
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause or under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to authorize individuals to sue alleged perpetrators of
gender-motivated violence in federal court. 24 In that particular case, the Court's
holding meant that a female college student who had been raped by a fellow
student on a college campus could not pursue a remedy.
The Supreme Court's decision in Castle Rock v. Gonzales is also a
significant target of ERA proponents. In Castle Rock, a woman unsuccessfully
sued her town for its police force's failure to enforce a restraining order against
25her husband. Because the restraining order was not enforced, the violent
husband succeeded in abducting and murdering their three children. Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court found no violation of the woman's
22. Id.
23. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
24. Id. at 617-18, 625-27.
25. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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constitutional Due Process rights. The ERA Coalition suggests that "[a]n ERA
could require that states meet Constitutional sex equality standards in the
enforcement of their laws against gender violence and expand the federal power
to legislate against these crimes."
26
4. Women's Underrepresentation in Leadership
A video that was a precursor to the Equal Means Equal documentary
illustrates "[t]he Situation Today Without the ERA," noting that "[w]omen are
52% of the population but only 17% of Congress," that "[w]omen are 46.5% of
the workforce but only 12% of its corporate officers," and that "[w]omen are
55% of Hollywood's audience but only 9% of its directors."27 Women's
underrepresentation in positions of decision-making power is another inequality
that concerns ERA proponents.
An August 2015 report of Congress's Joint Economic Committee, issued on
the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment, lists the "[e]conomic
challenges facing women today." First on the list is the fact that "[a]lthough
women hold over half of all professional-level jobs, they are underrepresented in
leadership positions, holding about 5 percent of CEO positions and only 17
percent of board seats at Fortune 500 companies." 28 In addition to pay inequities,
the list also includes the lack of paid leave for new mothers and the earnings gap
between mothers and women without children. In 2007, Representative Carolyn
Maloney directly linked the underrepresentation of women in government and
business to her support for the Equal Rights Amendment.
29
5. Post-Industrial Gender Inequalities
The issues on the twenty-first-century ERA agenda are post-industrial
manifestations of gender inequality. All of these problems-pay inequity, failure
to accommodate pregnancy and motherhood in the economic sphere, violence
against women, underrepresentation of women in leadership-arise in the
context of the transformation of gender roles that evolved throughout the
twentieth century. When the U.S. Constitution was adopted, and even at the
moment when the Nineteenth Amendment empowered women to vote, women
26. Why We Need an Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 14.
27. How Does Not Having the Equal Rights Amendment Affect Me?, ERA EDUC. PROJECT,
http://eraeducationproject.com/how-does-not-having-the-equal-rights-amendment-affect-me.
28. Carolyn B. Maloney, Women and the Economy: Celebrating Women's Equality Day, U.S.
CONG., JOINT ECON. COMMITTEE (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/wysiwyg-uploaded/Women / 2527s / 2OEqualit
y%20Day%2OFacto20Sheet%2OFinal%20-%2008%2026%202015.pdf.
29. Press Release, Senators Kennedy & Boxer, Reps. Maloney & Nadler Begin New Push for
Women's Equality Amendment (Mar. 28, 2007), https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/senators-kennedy-boxer-reps-maloney-nadler-begin-new-push-women%E2%80%99s-equality-
amendment.
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and men occupied traditional roles and functions in creating, raising, and
sustaining the next generation of American citizens. The industrial economy
allocated market work to men, and the unpaid caregiving work of raising the next
generation of workers was left to women. In economist Heather Boushey's view,
the "American Wife" was America's silent partner, helping to grow the
American economy by supporting her breadwinning husband and raising
children. 3° Or, as Anne-Marie Slaughter puts it, "women at home" was
America's "infrastructure of care" in past generations.
31
But throughout the twentieth century, these roles eroded with
deindustrialization and the emergence of post-industrial economies with large
technology and service sectors. These economies depend on the market work of
women. By the late twentieth century, the traditional assumption that one parent
(the mother) was available full-time to raise children, fully supported by a (male)
breadwinner, no longer held. By 1970, around the time that Congress adopted
the ERA, 30% of women were in the workforce; 32 today, 59% are. 33 Among
mothers with children under the age of eighteen, 70% participate in the labor
market. 34 Most families with children need two incomes to afford housing,
healthcare, education, and other basic needs. 35 As of 2006, two-paycheck couples
were more numerous than male-breadwinner households were in 1970.36 In
addition, nearly 40% of families with children have a sole female breadwinner.
37
Fewer than one-third of children in 2012 lived in a family with a stay-at-home
caregiver.38 As Arlie Hochschild has noted, "[w]omen's move into the economy
is the basic social revolution of our time." 39 What this means is that the male-
breadwinner, female-caregiver family is no longer a viable or feasible structure
for raising the next generation of U.S. citizens. The twenty-first-century gender
inequalities that form the core concerns of the current ERA movement are
symptoms of this incomplete economic transition. Throughout the twentieth
century, the male-breadwinner, female-caregiver family slowly declined as a
structure for raising the next generation, as an increasing number of mothers
30. See HEATHER BOUSHEY, FINDING TIME: THE ECONOMICS OF WORK-LIFE CONFLICT 5-7
(2016).
31. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN WORK FAMILY 232
(2015).
32. Women in the Labor Force, 1970-2009, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted20 11/ted_20110105.htm.
33. Data and Statistics. Women in the Labor Force, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/statsdata.htm.
34. Id.
35. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-
CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 8 (2003).
36. See KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: How A NEW GENERATION IS
RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA 4 (2010). Gerson's book provides a qualitative
study of the experiences of families with single, two-paycheck, and same-sex parents.
37. See BOUSHEY, supra note 30, at 7.
38. Id., fig. 1.1.
39. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 250 (2d ed. 2003) (1989).
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became breadwinners. While the twenty-first-century parent is typically both
caregiver and breadwinner, our institutions have not adapted to this new reality.
Pay inequity, unfair treatment of pregnant workers, violence against women, and
women's underrepresentation in leadership illustrate the gap between our
institutions and the reality we now inhabit. A constitutional response is
appropriate.
Take, for instance, the problems of pay inequity and unfair treatment of
pregnant workers and working mothers; these issues arise because of the change
in the roles of men and women in social reproduction. Paying men more than
women may have made sense in an economic system that assumed that men were
breadwinners and women were dependent caregivers. Men had to make a "family
wage." 40 Not accommodating pregnancy nor paying for parental leave also made
sense in an industrial economy in which women did not work and raise children
at the same time. But now the post-industrial economy depends on women's
participation in the labor market, including during women's childbearing and
childrearing years. Twenty-first-century economies depend on women's work,
and thus leave a gap in the functions covered in the past by the American Wife.
A system-wide solution is needed.
The violence against women highlighted by ERA activists can also be
understood as a problem with post-industrial specificity. Violence against
women is in part a reaction to the threats to masculinity occasioned by the late-
twentieth-century dynamics of post-industrial economies. Deindustrialization
and the decline of manufacturing are linked to the decline of the man's dominion
within the household as the exclusive breadwinner. Deindustrialization brought
about higher levels of male unemployment, and the accompanying downward
mobility, stress, and demoralization are associated with higher incidence of
violence against women. The rise of sex trafficking is also explained by the
profitability of an underground sector that has grown in this late-twentieth-
century economic context.
42
B. The Mismatch Between ERA Politics and Law
For those convinced of the need for law to intervene more robustly on these
post-industrial gender inequality problems, it is not obvious that a constitutional
amendment would be effective or appropriate, even if it were politically feasible.
Many U.S. constitutional law scholars believe that the Supreme Court's approach
to sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause has produced a "de facto
40. See BOUSHEY, supra note 30, at 12.
41. See Deborah M. Weissman, Domestic Violence and the Postindustrial Household, in VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS] 11, 117 (Evan Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds., 2009).
42. See MEREDITH DANK ET AL., THE URBAN INST., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF
THE UNDERGROUND COMMERCIAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR CITIES (2014).
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ERA." 43 As feminist law professor Mary Anne Case observes, "the current
constitutional law of sex discrimination is almost exactly what E.R.A. supporters
in the 1970s hoped for from the E.R.A." 44 At the same time, Professor Reva
Siegel has suggested that the "de facto ERA" achieved through Equal Protection
jurisprudence reflects compromises made by feminist ERA proponents in efforts
to gain public support in the face of a growing opposition movement. 45 It is thus
important to map out and evaluate current ERA proponents' understandings of
why a constitutional amendment is needed now, and how it would work as a legal
intervention.
Today's ERA proponents envision the ERA as doing three things that current
Equal Protection sex equality doctrine does not do. First, they propose that the
ERA would require strict scrutiny for sex classifications in the law, such that sex
distinctions would be treated just like race distinctions facing an Equal Protection
46
challenge. Second, ERA proponents believe that the ERA would invalidate
government practices that have a disparate impact on women.4 7 Third, they
believe that the congressional power to enforce the ERA would sweep more
48broadly than its analogue in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
would thus empower Congress to legislate more robustly on matters like violence
against women.
The difficulty is that there is nothing in the text of the ERA that obviously
requires strict scrutiny, disparate impact, or expanded congressional authority
any more so than does Equal Protection. The proposed ERA, which could
become law if ratified by three more states,49 reads in relevant part as follows:
43. See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004); Michael Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002); David Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
44. See Mary Anne Case, The Supreme Court Has Delivered on Many of the ERA's Promises, N.
Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/08/was-
the-eras-defeat-really-a-loss-for-feminism/the-supreme-court-has-deivered-on-many-of-the-eras-
promises.
45. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1403 (2006).
46. Congresswoman Maloney's explanation of the ERA on her website reads: "This critical
amendment would guarantee the equal rights of men and women by: make[sic] sex a suspect category
subject to strict judicial scrutiny, clarifying the legal status of sex discrimination for the courts. This would
prohibit sexual discrimination in the same way we have prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, and national origin." See Carolyn B. Maloney, Equal Rights Amendment,
https://maloney.house.gov/issues/womens-issues/equal-rights-ammendment.
47. See NEUWIRTH, supra note 7, at 19-31.
48. See Maloney, supra note 46; see also NEUWIRTH, supra note 7, at 68.
49. By the 1982 deadline for ratification of the ERA by the states, only 35 states had ratified the
constitutional amendment. Ratification by 38 states is required to amend the Constitution. ERA
proponents believe that ratification by three additional states, accompanied by congressional action
extending the 1982 deadline, is all that is needed to add the ERA to the Constitution. The theory is that,
since it was valid for Congress to extend the ERA deadline in 1978, it would be valid for Congress to
extend it again now. See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 13 (2014); Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Hemdon &
Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly
Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113 (1997); see also Representative Robert E. Andrews,
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Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
50
The U.S. Supreme Court applies intermediate, not strict scrutiny to sex
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, and refuses to recognize
disparate impact liability under Equal Protection. Courts embracing the
justifications for these approaches could easily apply the same rationale to
enforcing the Equal Rights Amendment. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
has taken a limited view of Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause. In Morrison v. United States, the Court held that Congress did not have
the power to enact the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy
provision, which permitted victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their
alleged perpetrators in federal court for civil damages. 5 1 The Court held that
Congress had to be proportionate and congruent in exercising its enforcement
power, and thus could not strike too broadly at private conduct that would not
itself violate the Equal Protection Clause. Courts could easily take the exact same
approach to the ERA, particularly since Section 1 of the ERA only prohibits
abridgment of equal rights by the federal and state governments, and not by
private actors.
For these reasons, the proposed ERA will not require a different approach to
strict scrutiny, disparate impact, or congressional enforcement authority than that
already present in the de facto ERA as established through Equal Protection sex
equality jurisprudence. Of course, the mere fact that the ERA would create a new
and separate textual source for sex equality reasoning would at least permit a
different approach to strict scrutiny, disparate impact, or congressional
enforcement authority if courts were looking to justify one. But this possibility
alone cannot be enough to motivate a formal constitutional amendment. After
all, those who are zealously committed to strict scrutiny, disparate impact, and
expanded enforcement authority against sex discrimination can continue to
litigate cases that urge the Supreme Court to overrule its precedents rejecting
strict scrutiny for sex classifications or disparate impact liability under Equal
Applauding the Recent Actions Taken by the Illinois State Legislature Regarding the Equal Rights
Amendment, 149 CONG. REC. 14,039-40 (2003). In some unratified states, such as Illinois and Virginia,
state legislatures have debated ratification bills in the past few years. See Illinois Senate Passes Resolution
to Ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, FEMINIST NEWSWIRE (May 23, 2014),
https://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2014/05/23/illinois-senate-passes-resolution-to-ratify-era; Travis
Fain, Equal Rights Amendment Passes, Then Doesn't, in Virginia Senate, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-ga-era-shenanigans-20150203-story.html.
50. See S.J. Res. 16, 114th Cong. (2015). This text is identical to the 1972 text that was adopted by
the requisite two-thirds majorities of Congress and then ratified by thirty-five states.
51. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Protection. It is imaginable that, one day, a Supreme Court with a different
composition might take a slightly broader view of congressional enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court has arguably
expanded the Commerce Clause in cases decided after Morrison,52 so an
expansion of Fourteenth Amendment Section Five power is plausible.
Of the three legal reforms that the ERA is imagined to require, one of them-
strict scrutiny for sex classifications-may introduce barriers to the ERA
movement's political agenda. In recent years, strict scrutiny for racial
classifications has enabled courts to dismantle or limit race-based affirmative
action and other efforts by public institutions to achieve racial integration or
diversity. 53 Laws and policies that take race into account-even to achieve
diversity-are suspect and subject to rigorous justification, leading to the demise
of many worthwhile experiments in achieving racial balance and integration in
public schools. ERA proponents point out the underrepresentation of women in
leadership positions,54 but strict scrutiny would actually make it harder than it is
today under intermediate scrutiny to adopt policies that consciously promote
gender balance or women in leadership. For instance, the recent laws enacted in
European countries that require gender parity on corporate boards of directors
55
would be suspect under strict scrutiny and highly unlikely to survive. Strict
scrutiny would not only invalidate gender quotas, but would also make it easier
to challenge and end other gender-conscious programs designed to reduce
women's unique disadvantages and injuries.
Consider, for instance, the decision by a California court to apply strict
56scrutiny to gender classifications under its state equal protection clause. Note
that it did not need a sex-based ERA to apply strict scrutiny to sex; it just used
state equal protection. More importantly, applying strict scrutiny to sex meant
invalidating the policy of providing state funding to battered women's shelters
that only admitted women victims of domestic violence and their children. In the
litigation, male plaintiffs, including one who claimed to be beaten by his wife
and was denied access to a battered women's shelter, brought suit. It is not
obvious that a commitment to gender equality should bar women-only domestic
52. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress could regulate the local
intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana under the Commerce Clause).
53. See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I1), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). Fisher I reinforced strict scrutiny as
the standard to apply to use of racial classifications in university admissions. Four Justices joined the
opinion holding the University of Texas's race-conscious affirmative action policy lawful, whereas three
dissenting Justices would have reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding the policy. In the absence
of five Justices voting to reverse the lower court's decision, the race-conscious policy survived strict
scrutiny in this case. See also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007). For a critique of the American use of heightened scrutiny for race- or sex-based quotas, see
generally Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences: A Transnational Re-evaluation, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DIsCRIMINATION LAW 228 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 147-148.
56. Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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violence shelters. One can see how male victims of domestic violence should
have access to safe spaces, but one can also see how, given the unique
psychological issues faced by battered women, men's presence might undermine
their sense of safety. Strict scrutiny would hamper public policy experimentation
to address these complex problems in a nuanced fashion, as it has in the context
of policy responses to racial injustice and inequality. The strict scrutiny desired
by 1970s ERA activists was formulated before strict scrutiny became an anti-
affirmative action tool, and it may be less desirable today.
The new text of the ERA, introduced in 2013, appears to be a closer fit to
the ERA movement's political agenda. This is in part due to the significant
substantive textual differences between the new text and the Equal Protection
Clause. But more importantly, the new ERA text, because it is new, can have
meanings and interpretations that are liberated from the meanings associated
with the legislative history of the 1972 congressional adoption and ratification
by thirty-five states. Whatever goals were desired in 1972 by the ERA's framers,
or compromised in the ratification process through 1982 to the present, would
not determine the meaning of a new ERA. The new text reads:
Section 1. Women shall have equal rights in the United States and every
place subject to its jurisdiction. Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.
Section 2. Congress and the several States shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
57
Professor Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out the legal benefits of the new
58text. The new ERA bill is more expansive than the 1972 text in that the first
sentence declares that women have equal rights with no mention of abridgment
by a state actor. The second sentence prohibits abridgment by a state actor. But
because the first sentence generally declares the right, it is like the Thirteenth
Amendment's declaration, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 59 The
Supreme Court has not imposed a state action requirement in interpreting the
scope of Thirteenth Amendment rights, particularly in its jurisprudence
interpreting the scope of Congress's authority to regulate private conduct to
enforce the ban on slavery. 60 A sentence declaring rights separately from the
57. H.R.J. Res. 52, 114th Cong. (2015).
58. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More than
Ever, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 569, 578-79 (2014).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
60. See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2008) ("Unlike its close cousin, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth
Amendment restrains not only government actors, but also private individuals. Private forms of
'involuntary servitude' violate the self-executing provisions of the Amendment, and private attempts to
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sentence prohibiting abridgment by state action opens up the possibility of
enforcing the right against private actors, and expanding the scope of legislative
enforcement power to reach more broadly across private conduct than does
legislative enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
61
The new version also introduces concurrent state power to enforce the
federal ERA within a federal constitutional amendment. There is no other similar
grant of enforcement power in the Constitution currently in force.62 Nonetheless,
this clause could carry significance if a conflict were to arise between state
legislative efforts to promote gender equality (for example, gender quotas in state
political party committees63 or special accommodations for pregnant workers)
and a federal judicial construction of the Equal Protection Clause scrutinizing
such sex classifications. A federal constitutional amendment authorizing the state
to enforce sex equality would cast the state statute as an enforcement of federal
constitutional law against a federal constitutional challenge emanating from a
different provision. I shall return to the question of state enforcement of post-
industrial gender equality in Part IV.
The new ERA text provides a better legal apparatus for the policy goal of
reducing post-industrial gender inequality. By firmly declaring women's equal
rights separately from the sentence prohibiting their abridgment on account of
sex by the state, the new text shares features in common with several
constitutions around the world, in which clauses prohibiting sex discrimination
are independent from clauses guaranteeing women's equality. In some
constitutional democracies, these clauses are enforced in constitutional litigation,
or otherwise viewed as normative legal sources that nudge legislative action. The
new ERA text lends itself to a dialogue with sex equality amendments in other
constitutions, particularly those that emerged in response to post-industrial
gender inequalities and supported policy agendas similar to those at the center of
today's American ERA movement.
perpetuate the 'badges and incidents of slavery' can be prohibited by Congress in legislation to enforce
the Amendment.").
61. See discussion of United States v. Morrison, supra text accompanying notes 23 to 24 and 51 to
52.
62. The Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within the United States, included Section 2, which provided that "Congress and the
several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933)). After its repeal, no other constitutional right
or declaration involves this dual delegation.
63. See infra Section IV.B.4.
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II. SEX EQUALITY IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Sex Equality Provisions and Global Gender Gap Rankings
Since ERA proponents frequently argue that the United States is virtually
alone in the world in its failure to constitutionalize sex equality, some attention
to foreign constitutions' sex equality provisions and the status of women in those
societies is informative. The World Economic Forum (WEF)'s annual Global
Gender Gap rankings measure the gender gap in 144 countries by various
indicators relevant to post-industrial gender inequality: women's economic
participation rates, men's and women's wages for comparable work,
representation of women in political institutions, and women's health and
education levels.64 Year after year, Norway consistently ranks in the top three for
closing the gender gap, but Norway's constitution makes no mention of sex or
gender equality. So we can't conclude that constitutionalizing sex equality by..-
text is necessary to reduce gender gaps. At the other end of the spectrum, Chad
ranks 1401h, very close to the bottom of the WEF's Global Gender Gap Rankings.
However, the constitution of Chad declares: "Chadians of both sexes have the
same rights and same duties. They are equal before the law.'65 So it is also wrong
to conclude that constitutionalizing sex equality by text is sufficient to achieve
gender-equal outcomes. Constitutional sex equality provisions are neither
necessary nor sufficient to reducing gender gaps.
So, what is the point of global constitutional inquiry? Recent efforts to assess
the comparative performance of constitutional clauses in a scientific manner
66
raise questions about whether generalizable normative insights can be drawn
from the effects of constitutions across such different national, cultural,
economic, and political contexts. My purpose here is somewhat different. I
collect and categorize snapshots of the textual clauses in constitutions that
explicitly speak to gender equality or inequality, and then provide a deeply
textured portrait of the evolving meaning of constitutional sex equality in legal
and political discourse. I focus on the examples that could best illuminate the
issues that most concern American ERA proponents today. How have the recent
constitutional changes abroad been linked in legal reasoning to these problems?
If any transformative moves have been made outside of the United States, can
such measures be usefully translated for the American constitutional trajectory?
I focus on the constitutional regimes that have taken their gender equality clauses
seriously, and thoughtfully worked through their evolution in debates at the
moment of adoption, through jurisprudence interpreting the clauses, and revision
64. The Global Gender Gap Index 2016, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 11 tbl.3,
http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/.
65. CHAD CONST. art. 13. All foreign constitutions hereinafter quoted and cited in English are
available from the Constitute Project at https://www.constituteproject.org/.
66. See, e.g., ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds., 2016).
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through later constitutional amendments. The approach here is translation, not
transplantation; engagement, not immersion. There are obvious differences in
historical and cultural context between the United States and other constitutional
orders, including, very importantly, foreign constitutions' conscious
commitment to positive rights, including social and economic rights.
Nonetheless, engaging law that we cannot possibly transplant can be useful in
helping us to deepen and refine our understanding of what is desirable, which, in
turn, can shift the way we inhabit and engage what is possible within our own
constitutional boundaries. Furthermore, our ERA was first proposed almost a
century ago, and then came closest to adoption almost a half-century ago, at a
moment when the post-industrial shift in traditional gender roles was in an earlier
stage. More recent constitutional activity in similar post-industrial democracies
can serve as a sounding board for constitutional modernization in the United
States.
The United States ranks forty-fifth out of 144 countries in 2016. As noted in
Part I, the American ERA activists tend to be primarily concerned with gender
gaps that can be described as post-industrial, which makes high-income countries
most relevant for comparison. In the WEF's ranking of fifty high-income
countries, the United States ranks twenty-sixth. I examined the sex equality-
related provisions of the high-income countries that ranked higher than the
United States in the WEF 2016 gender equality index: Iceland, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Ireland, Slovenia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Germany, the
Netherlands, France, Latvia, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, Belgium,
Lithuania, Barbados, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Canada, Bahamas, Poland,
and Trinidad and Tobago.67 In examining the constitutions of these countries,
many of which are members of the European Union, I identified three types of
constitutional provisions that address sex or gender equality or inequality.
The first is a guarantee of equality without discrimination on various
grounds. These guarantees are roughly equivalent to the U.S. Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause, but I noted those equality or nondiscrimination
guarantees that explicitly name sex or gender as a prohibited ground of
distinction or discrimination. The second type of provision guarantees equality
using language other than antidiscrimination. These are essentially substantive
equality clauses, but substantive equality is defined differently across different
constitutions. Some use the term "equal access by men and women," others
"factual equality" or "equal treatment" or "equal rights." Some, but not all, of
these provisions were amendments that were added in the last three decades to
authorize positive measures to reduce gender inequality, such as gender quotas
for decisionmaking positions. The third type of provision is a special protection
for mothers. From the U.S. perspective, these provisions might not register as
equality provisions, since American legal feminists historically fought to
67. The Global Gender Gap Index 2016, supra note 64, at 25 tbl.6.
[Vol. 28:381
2017] An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century 401
eradicate such protections. 68 At the same time, current ERA activists have
suggested that the ERA would enable pregnant worker accommodations. Thus,
the constitutional provisions in other countries most relevant to this problem
must be examined. Indeed, in many countries, the protection of mothers-
through paid maternity leave, pregnancy accommodations, protections from
termination of employment during pregnancy, and childcare rights-plays a
significant role in enabling women's access to employment. It is worth noting,
from a gender equality perspective, those countries which have
constitutionalized the special protection of mothers.
Table 1. WEF 25 High-Income Countries with Narrowest Gender Gaps: Textual
Provisions in Constitutions
Country Sex Equality or Substantive Maternity or
Nondiscrimination Equality for Pregnancy
Women
Ieland Art. 65 NO
Finland Ch. 2, § 6 Ch. 2, § 6 No
5rorN rrz rf
Sweden Ch. 2, Part 4, art. 13 Ch. 1, art. 2 No
[Ireland NO Art.4 Art. 41.L)
Slovenia Art. 14 No No
New4L adA q, 21 j No N~o
Switzerland Art. 8.1 & 8.2 Art. 8.3 & 8.4 Art. 41.2
i Germnl An 3*r.%2 &A3.3 Ar~t, S4. Art. 6.4*A
Netherlands Art. 1 No No
France Preablej3 @146)f Ad. I Prabe 1
Latvia No No No
United N/A N/A N/A
Kingdom
ttonia _Art. 12 No
Belgium Art. 10 Art. I lbis No
............ ..
Barbados Ch. III, art. I No No
L _Spain §14 No
Portugal Art. 13.2 Art. 9h Art. 59(2)c
68. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International
Human Rights Perspective, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 253, 268 (1999) (warning against protections for women
that "perpetuate myths or stereotypes inhibiting women's achievement of their full human potential.").
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LLuxembouirg Art. 11. N~ rt, 1. 2 N~Oj
Canada Art. 15.1,Art. 28 Art. 15.2 No
Biahamnas Art, 15 No__ _ No
Poland Art. 33 Art. 33 Art. 68.3, Art.
_71.2
Tiidad and Ar .1. N.4 N o o
B. Antidiscrimination
A paradigmatic example of a general equal protection clause that prohibits
sex discrimination along with many other prohibited grounds, can be found in
the Section 6 of the Finnish constitution: "Everyone is equal before the law. No
one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently from other persons
on the ground of sex, age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, health,
disability or other reason that concerns his or her person."69 Another model is the
stand-alone guarantee of equal rights for men and women (and not for other
groups or categories), which is assumed to prohibit discrimination on grounds of
sex. In France, for example, the 1946 Preamble's guarantee to women of "equal
rights to those of men in all spheres" 70 has been understood to prohibit
discrimination based on sex.
7 1
C. Substantive Equality
The line between these non-discrimination provisions, on the one hand, and
substantive equality provisions, on the other, is not always clear. Many
constitutions simply guarantee equality, or equal rights, or equal treatment to
men and women, which can be interpreted as merely a prohibition of sex
discrimination or as a guarantee of substantive equality. This ambiguity is
significant from the U.S. perspective because the new 2013 House version of the
ERA states that "women shall have equal rights in the United States . . .,"
followed by the promise that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 72 In
Iceland, which ranks first in the Global Gender Gap Rankings this year, Article
65 of the constitution provides: "Everyone shall be equal before the law and
enjoy human rights irrespective of sex, religion, opinion, national origin, race,
69. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [CONSTITUTION], § 6 (Fin.).
70. 1958 CONST. 1946 Preamble § 3 (Fr.).
71. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 81-133DC, Dec. 30,
1981 (Fr.).
72. See H.R. J. Res. 52, 114th Cong. (2015) and discussion at text accompanying note 57, supra.
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colour, property, birth or other status. Men and women shall enjoy equal rights
in all respects." 73 Similarly, the Belgian constitution guarantees "equality
between women and men." 74 Article 1 of the French constitution notably does
not prohibit sex distinctions; it guarantees "the equality of all citizens before the
law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion." 75 The French Preamble of
1946 states, "The law guarantees women equal rights to those of men in all
spheres, ' 76 and it has been read not only to prohibit sex discrimination, but also
to justify legislative efforts to combat women's exclusion. 77 Similarly, the
German constitution says, "Men and women shall have equal rights." 78 The
constitution of Luxembourg says, "Women and men are equal in rights and
duties, '79 and the Netherlands' constitution frames the right in terms of equal
treatment: "All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal
circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political
opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted."8
Some constitutional courts have read these equality guarantees as merely
embodying a formal equality ban on sex discrimination, whereas others have
read them as expressing an aspiration to substantive equality.
Nonetheless, some of these constitutions provide further clarification of the
meaning of these equality guarantees by additionally addressing substantive
equality. Germany provides a notable example, with an amendment that was
debated and adopted in the process of German reunification in 1994. Before
1994, Articles 3(2) and 3(3) stated, "Men and women shall have equal rights,"
and "No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race,
language, homeland, and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. ' 8 1 Then,
in 1994, a sentence was inserted in Article 3(2) that reads, "The state shall
promote the actual implementation of equal rights for men and women and take
steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist."
82
Similarly, consider Finland's provision, dating to 1995:
Everyone is equal before the law.
73. STJORNARSKRA L'YDVELDISINS ISLANDS [CONSTITUTION] art. 65 (Ice.).
74. 1994 CONST. art. 10 (BeIg.).
75. 1958 CONST. art. I (Fr.).
76. 1958 CONST. 1946 Preamble (Fr.). The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution was preserved and
became part of the 1958 Constitution.
77. See MICHEL DE VILLIERS & THIERRY S. RENOUX, CODE CONSTITUTIONNEL 352 (2014)
(providing an annotated constitution with commentary).
78. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law],
art. 3(2), May 23, 1949 (Ger.).
79. 1868 CONST. art. 11 (amended 2006) (Luxembourg).
80. Gw. [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (Neth.).
81. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZI [GG] [Basic Law],
art. 3, May 23, 1949 (Ger.).
82. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 3, https://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/englisch gg/englischgg.html#p0024 (Ger.).
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No one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently from
other persons on the ground of sex, age, origin, language, religion,
conviction, opinion, health, disability or other reason that concerns his
or her person.
Equality of the sexes is promoted in societal activity and working life,
especially in the determination of pax13 and other terms of employment,
as provided in more detail by an Act.
Another interesting example is found in the Portuguese constitution. Article 9
lists "[flundamental tasks of the state," which include "promot[ing] equality
between men and women."
84
Many of these amendments directing the state to implement "real equality,"
"factual equality," or "equal access" between men and women were adopted in
the 1990s and early 2000s. 85 Some amendments were explicit attempts to resolve
constitutional conflicts about the compatibility of legislation mandating gender
balance in political institutions with pre-existing constitutional guarantees of
equality. International and supranational norms played a significant role in
bringing about these changes. Finland's sex equality promotion clauses appeared
during constitutional reforms to facilitate Finland's accession to the European
Union. In addition, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action emerging
from the United Nations World Conference on Women in 1995 included the
strategic objective of governments taking measures to ensure women's equal
access and full participation in power structures and decisionmaking. 86 In
addition, the European Commission had encouraged member states since the
1980s to adopt policies to ensure women's equal representation in
decisionmaking positions, 87 but those adopted by some member states were
challenged or struck down based on national constitutional guarantees of
equality.
In France, a 1999 amendment added language to Article 3 addressing
suffrage, stating: "The law shall promote equal access by men and women to the
electoral mandate and to elected positions." 88 In 2008, the constitution was
amended again, deleting the Article 3 provision and adding language to Article
83. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [CONSTITUTION], § 6 (Fin.).
84. 1976 CONST. art. 9 (Port.).
85. 1 provide more details regarding the conflicts in France that gave rise to such amendments in
1999 and 2008 in Part IllI, infra.
86. U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
strategic objective G.1, 190.
87. See First Programme of Action by the Commission of 14 December 1981, for 1982-85,
Communication to the Council, bull. Suppl. 2/86, 9, No. 19, p. 5.
88. Loi constitutionnelle no. 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative 5 l'6galit6 entre les femmes et les
hommes (])[Constitutional Law of July 8, 1999 on Equality Between Women and Men (1), Journal official
de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 9, 1999, p. 10175.
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1 to expand the scope of the state's duty to reduce gender gaps. Article 1 now
reads:
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without
distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall
be organised on a decentralised basis.
Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elected
offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and social
responsibility.
89
Similar provisions explicitly authorizing measures to promote equal access by
men or women or to alleviate the disadvantage of women are found in the
constitutions of Belgium,9 ° Greece,91 Hungary,92 Italy, 3 Malta, 4 Portugal,9 5
Romania, 96 Slovenia, 97 Sweden,98 Canada, 99 and South Africa. Most of these
constitutional clauses authorizing (and possibly requiring) positive action are'
amendments that were adopted since the 1990s.
D. Maternity Protection
Finally, a good number of constitutions have provisions guaranteeing the
special protection of mothers. Some of the articles that impose the duty to protect
mothers also include children, the elderly, and/or the disabled. I regard these
provisions as "special" protections for mothers, even if these other categories of
persons are included, when the protection is reserved specifically for "mothers"
rather than gender-neutral "parents" or "mothers and fathers." In Germany, this
protection appears in Article 6, which establishes the constitutional status of the
family in general. It is worth quoting in full:
Article 6 [Marriage and the family; children born outside of marriage]
89. 1958 CONST. art. I (Fr.) (amended 2008).
90. 1994 CONST. art. I Ibis (BeIg.) (amended 2002).
91. 2000 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 116 (Greece) (as amended 2001).
92. 2011 MAGYARORSZkG ALAPTORVtNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTORVENY, art. XV. The sentence on promoting the achievement of equality of opportunity does not
mention gender or women, but it immediately follows the section that guarantees women and men equal
rights. Id.
93. Costituzione [Cost.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 (It.) (amended 2003).
94. 1964 CONST. arts. 14, 45.11 (Malta) (amended 2003).
95. 1976 CONST. art. 109 (Port.) (amended 1997).
96. 1991 CONST. art. 16.3 (Rom.) (amended 2003).
97. 1991 CONST. art. 43 (Slovn.) (amended 2004).
98. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 1:2 (Swed.).
99. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, art. 15.2 (U.K.).
100. 1996 S. AFR. CONST. art. 9.2, 174 (S. Afr.).
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(1) Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the
state.
(2) The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents
and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over
them in the performance of this duty.
(3) Children may be separated from their families against the will of
their parents or guardians only pursuant to a law, and only if the parents
or guardians fail in their duties or the children are otherwise in danger
of serious neglect.
(4) Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the
community.
(5) Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation
with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and
for their position in society as are enjoyed by those born within
marriage.
The right of mothers to the special protection of the state is embedded in an
amendment that also imposes a duty on the part of the state to give special
protection to marriage, family, and children. In Germany, the protection of
motherhood and the protection for children born outside of marriage originated
in the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and were written again into the 1949 West
German Basic Law in their present form.' 0' In the French constitution, Paragraph
11 of the 1946 Preamble articulates the special protection of mothers in the
context of pronouncing the Nation's duty towards its most vulnerable members.
Paragraph 11 reads:
[The nation] shall guarantee to all, notably to children, mothers and
elderly workers, protection of their health, material security, rest and
leisure. All people who, by virtue of their age, physical or mental
condition, or economic situation, are incapable of working, shall have
to the right to receive suitable means of existence from society.'1 02
The guarantee of special protection for mothers, often articulated in the context
of protections for children, marriage, the family, the elderly, or the disabled, are
very common in the constitutions of the formerly communist Eastern European
countries. Bulgaria, 103 Croatia, 104 the Czech Republic,l°5 Hungary, 106
101. See ROBERT G. MOELLER, PROTECTING MOTHERHOOD: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN THE
POLITICS OF POSTWAR WEST GERMANY 38-75 (1993).
102. 1958 CONST. preamble II (Fr.).
103. CONST. art. 47(2) (Bulg.).
104. CONST. art. 65 (Croat.).
105. tistavni zAkon 6. 1/1993 Sb., Ustava Cesk6 Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic],
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, ch. 4, art. 29(1), 32(2).
106. MAGYARORSZAG ALAPTORVENYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTORVNYE, art. XIX.
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Lithuania, 107 Poland, 108 and Slovakia' ° 9 all have such provisions. But explicit
constitutional protection of mothers or pregnant women can be found in the
constitutions of Italy, 11 0 Ireland, 1 1 and Greece1 12 as well.
Many European constitutions have provisions that guarantee formal equality
and non-discrimination, and further provisions that separately address some form
of substantive equality between men and women. The maternity protection
clause is also very common. As Part III will illustrate, these clauses evolved to
encompass a vision of women's constitutional equality that responds to the
concerns of the ERA revival. Belgium, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Greece,
Germany, and France have added sex equality amendments to their constitutions
since the 1990s. These amendments legitimize and encourage govemment
initiatives to promote women's participation in political and economic life. In
some jurisdictions, these amendments have also catalyzed reforms intended to
reduce women's disadvantages and burdens stemming from motherhood and
caregiving.
III. FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION TO ACTUAL EQUALITY: Two JURISDICTIONS
WITH RECENT AMENDMENTS
I now present a more focused, textured portrait of the evolution of
constitutional sex equality and the trajectory of sex equality amendments in two
jurisdictions, Germany and France. The focus on Germany and France might be
criticized as comparativism of the cherry-picking variety. But cherry-picking is
sometimes appropriate, depending on one's purpose. When one's purpose is not
to identify a global consensus on sex equality, but rather to study thoughtful
approaches to a set of legal problems, focusing on well-theorized examples
("cherries") is what one must do.1 13 Warnings against comparing apples to
oranges justify similar caution when comparing cherries to apples or oranges.
Looking to Germany and France does not entail the proposition that what has
worked in these places will work in the United States. The purpose of looking
beyond our borders is to engage real-world examples of post-industrial gender
constitutionalism as an imagination-broadening exercise. Germany and France
107. CONST. art. 39 (Lith.). This provision entitles working mothers to "paid leave before and after
childbirth as well as favourable working conditions and other concessions."
108. CONST. art. 71 (Pol.) ("A mother, before and after birth, shall have the right to special
assistance from public authorities, to the extent specified by statute.").
109. CONST. art. 41(2) (Slovk.) ("Pregnant women shall be entitled to special treatment, terms of
employment, and working conditions.").
110. Costituzione [Const.] art. 37 (It.) ("Working conditions must allow women to fulfil their
essential role in the family and ensure the appropriate protection for the mother and child.").
Ill. Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 41(2)(2) ("The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that
mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties at
home.").
112. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 21(1) (Greece).
113. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 64 to 67.
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are good examples because they both shared some (but not all) things in common
with the United States regarding the legal status of women in constitutional law
in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, they are both examples ofjurisdictions which
have developed a constitutional discourse around some of the gender inequalities
focused on by today's American ERA activists, such as pay inequity, the
persistence of traditional gender roles in the family, and the underrepresentation
of women in positions of power. Germany and France have both moved away
from the 1970s and 1980s concerns with scrutinizing sex classifications in the
law towards a vision of sex equality as a principle that government must make
real. In Germany, the maternity protection clause is construed together with the
non-discrimination and substantive equality clauses. In France, sex equality is
becoming a legitimizing constitutional principle rather than a judicially
enforceable fundamental right. While both of these jurisprudential moves may at
first glance seem to weaken women's rights to equality, I shall highlight their
advantages. The shift from strict scrutiny towards a critical appreciation of
motherhood's effects on women's economic and political participation, and the
shift from rights to principles, have laid a constitutional foundation for public
policies that enable men to do more caregiving, accommodate pregnancy, and
increase women's representation in decisionmaking positions.
A. Germany
1. The 1950s: Antidiscrimination and Traditional Gender Roles
Article 3(2) of the German constitution has stated that "men and women
shall have equal rights" since 1949.114 There is an additional section in Article
3(3), also adopted in 1949, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex as
well as other characteristics: "No person shall be favoured or disfavoured
because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland, and origin, faith, or
religious or political opinions." Germany's 1949 constitution had founding
mothers as well as founding fathers. They worried that the non-discrimination
guarantee in Article 3(3) would be inadequate. 115 Article 3(2) emerged as a result
of a campaign by feminists. Elisabeth Selbert, a member of the Social
Democratic Party and one of the four women who served on the Parliamentary
Council for the drafting and adoption of the new Basic Law, played a pivotal role
in the adoption of Article 3(2). 116 Selbert believed that Article 3(2) was intended
114. For the period from 1949 to German reunification in 1994, my references to the German
constitution or Federal Constitutional Court are intended to refer to the West German constitution and
court.
11 5. See Ninon Colneric, Making Equality Law More Effective: Lessons from the German
Experience, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 230 (1996).
116. See Justice Renate Jaeger, The Federal Constitutional Court: Fifty Years of the Struggle for
Gender Equality, 2 GERMAN L.J. 35 (2001) available at
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/index.php?pagelD= 11 &artlD=35; Susanne Baer, The Basic Law at 60
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to guarantee equality by recognizing differences, 117 notwithstanding the
language of Article 3(3) which appeared to prohibit all differences in treatment
based on sex. Nonetheless, the Federal Constitutional Court long treated Article
3(2) ("equal rights") and Article 3(3) ("nondiscrimination") as having the same
legal effect and meaning." 8
From the early 1950s, the Federal Constitutional Court read both Articles
3(2) and 3(3) as merely prohibiting unjustified differential treatment of women
and men. In its jurisprudence, it permitted some forms of sex-based differential
treatment, invoking biological and functional differences that made men and
women differently situated. In 1953, for instance, the Federal Constitutional
Court pointed to maternity as a biological difference that justified women's
special treatment, which was bolstered by Article 6(1) of the Constitution, the
clause protecting marriage and the family. 1 9 Using this logic, in 1956, the
Federal Constitutional Court upheld a labor code provision limiting the workingh 120
hours of women. Invoking the same principle, the Constitutional Court in 1957
held that penal provisions against male homosexuality did not violate the equality
and non-discrimination guarantees in Article 3(2) and 3(3), in an opinion that
catalogued a wide array of expert and scientific opinions on the different social
threats posed by male and female homosexuality. The cases of the 1950s
construed the Article 3(2) equality of rights guarantee as doing no more than
prohibiting discrimination, and the Article 3(3) antidiscrimination guarantee as
permitting different treatment pursuant to review similar to American rational
basis review. Nonetheless, even under this regime, the Federal Constitutional
Court declared in 1959 that men and women were equal in marriage, and struck
down Civil Code provisions that accorded more weight to fathers than to mothers
in the exercise of parental authority over minor children in the event of
disagreements between the parents. 122
2. Heightened Scrutiny for Sex Distinctions from the 1970s to the 1990s
Continuing in this vein, in the 1960s and 1970s, the German Federal
Constitutional Court more frequently rejected statutes that treated men and
women differently. The sex equality jurisprudence of Article 3 evolved similarly
to that of the U.S. Supreme Court's Equal Protection sex cases. For instance, in
- Equality and Difference: A Proposal for the Guest List to the Birthday Party, 11 GERMAN L.J. 67, 70
(2010).
117. Baer, supra note 116, at 70.
118. See Colneric, supra note 115, at 231.
119. BVERFGE 3,225 (1953), 42.
120. BVerfG 1 BvR 53/54, May 25, 1956). For a discussion of regulation of women's work during
this period, see Dagmar Schiek, Lifting the Ban on Women 's Night Work in Europe: A Straight Road to
Equality in Employment? 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 309 (1996).
121. BVERFGE 6,389(1957).
122. BVERFGE 10, 59 (1959).
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1974, the Constitutional Court, invoking Article 3(2), invalidated a statutory
provision that had granted German citizenship to the illegitimate child of a
German father and foreign mother, but withheld citizenship from the illegitimate
child of a German mother and foreign father, except when the child would be
otherwise stateless. 123 In 1977, the court departed from the notion that
"functional" differences between men and women, including women's
traditional caregiving role, could justify sex-based differences in treatment. 24
During this period, the court applied heightened scrutiny to statutory sex
distinctions, and rejected justifications for differential treatment that perpetuated
the traditional sex roles that had led to women's inequality. 25 This line of cases
culminated in the 1991 decision on married names, in which the Federal
Constitutional Court struck down a Civil Code provision that treated the
husband's birth name as the default name to be taken as a married couple's
family name in the event that the spouses failed to make a specific declaration of
their chosen married name. 26 The court held that this provision was
incompatible with the "equality of rights" guarantee in Article 3(2).
The Court also began to work out the relationship between the gender
equality and non-discrimination guarantees in Article 3 and the special protection
of mothers in Article 6(4). In 1979, the Federal Constitutional Court invoked
Article 6(4) to invalidate a provision of the Maternity Protection Law for
127insufficiently protecting a pregnant employee from dismissal. The statute
generally prohibited the dismissal of pregnant employees and made such
dismissals void only if the employer knew of the pregnancy or was informed of
it within two weeks of the pregnant worker's dismissal. A terminated female
employee had informed her employer immediately after she found out that she
was pregnant (but more than two weeks after the dismissal), in an effort to
invalidate her dismissal. In this case, the Court seems to view pregnancy as a
disadvantage that the employer must accommodate pursuant to the maternity
protection clause. The maternity protection clause obligates the state to protect
pregnant workers by accommodating them, beyond merely prohibiting
discrimination against the pregnant woman.
In the late 1980s, the Federal Constitutional Court suggested that the "equal
rights" guaranteed in Article 3(2) went beyond prohibiting discrimination as
articulated in Article 3(3). In 1987, a male complainant challenged a social
security statute that granted women the right to old-age pensions from the age of
60, whereas men had to wait until the age of 65 to access their pensions. The
constitutional complaint was rejected, and the differential treatment was upheld,
123. BVERFGE 37, 217 (1974).
124. See ANNE PETERS, WOMEN, QUOTAS, AND CONSTITUTIONS 159 (1999) (citing BVERFGE 43,
213, 225-26 (1977)).
125. See Jaeger, supra note 116.
126. BVERFGE 84,9(1991).
127. BVERFGE 52, 357 (1979).
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on the grounds that "social considerations," namely the "double burden"
sustained by working women as a result of their traditional caregiving role,
justified the differential treatment. There was no discrimination on grounds of
sex under Article 3(2) or 3(3) in the event of a measure aiming to compensate
disadvantages associated with the double burden.' 28 In 1991, in the context of
German reunification, a law abolishing various civil service positions in the
former East Germany was held unconstitutional on the grounds that it failed to
sufficiently protect pregnant employees from dismissal and was therefore
contrary to Article 6(4).129 In a jurisprudential context where the duty to protect
mothers and pregnant workers is enforced and recognized, it goes without saying
that at least some special legal protections for pregnant women and mothers can
be adopted without running afoul of equality guarantees.
At the same time, the Court continued to scrutinize sex classifications, and
it decided a landmark case in 1992 applying heightened scrutiny to a sex
classification, parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in United
States v. Virginia. There, the German Constitutional Court struck down a statute
prohibiting women's nighttime employment. The law had been defended as a
protection of women, who were assumed to be more susceptible to harm by night
work due to women's daytime responsibilities for child-rearing. In striking down
the ban, the Court explained that it was not merely the sex classification that
rendered the law unconstitutional under Article 3(3), 130 but that the operation of
the law undermined women's factual equality, which must be protected under
Article 3(2):
Insofar as investigations show that women are more seriously harmed
by night work, this conclusion is generally traced to the fact that they
are also burdened with housework and child rearing .... Women who
carry out these duties in addition to night work outside the home...
obviously suffer the adverse consequences of nocturnal employment to
an enhanced degree.... But the present ban on night work for all female
labourers cannot be supported on this ground, for the additional burden
of housework and child rearing is not a sufficiently gender specific
characteristic. 1
In addition to recognizing the changing roles of men and women in relation to
housework and child rearing, the Court was also concerned with the effects of
the ban on night work on women's economic opportunities. The Court framed
128. BVERFGE 74, 163 (1987). The decision focuses on Article 3(2), and highlights not only
women's double burden, but also other disadvantages faced by women in employment.
129. BVerfG, 1BvR 1341/90 (1991), http://www.bverfg.de/e/rsl9910424 lbvrl34190.htmi.
130. "Not every inequality based on sex offends Article 3(3)." See BVERFGE 85, 191 (1992).
(Trans. Donald Kommers, German Law Archive), http://www.iuscomp.org/wordpress/?p=79.
131. Id.
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women's access to employment as a primary concern of Article 3(2)'s guarantee
of equal rights:
The infringement of the discrimination ban of Article 3 (3) is not justified
by the equal opportunity command of Article 3(2). The prohibition of
night work ... does not promote the goals of this provision. It is true
that it protects a number of women.., from nocturnal employment that
is hazardous to their health. But this protection is coupled with
significant disadvantages: Women are thereby prejudiced in their search
for jobs. They may not accept work that must be done even in part at
night. In some sectors this has led to a clear reduction in the training and
employment of women. In addition, women labourers are not free to
dispose as they choose of their own working time. One result of all this
may be that women will continue to be more burdened than men by child
rearing and housework in addition to work outside the home, and that
the traditional division of labour between the sexes may be further
entrenched. To this extent the prohibition of night work impedes the
elimination of the social disadvantages suffered by women.1
32
Thus, what emerges from the night work case is an approach that permits the
differential treatment of men and women under Article 3(3) when that
differential treatment furthers the goals of equal rights as articulated in Article
3(2). The Court noted that the sentence "Men and women shall have equal rights"
"is designed not only to do away with legal norms that base advantages or
disadvantages o[n]sex but also to bring about equal opportunity for men and
women in the future. It is aimed at the equalization of living conditions."'' 33 It
was "a constitutional mandate to foster equal standing of men and women...
that extends to social reality."' 
34
3. The "Actual Implementation of Equal Rights ".-Amendment, Affirmative
Action, and Disparate Impact
The night work case was part of a growing legal and political discourse
concerning the legitimacy of affirmative action for women, including gender
quotas in the civil service. The issue became salient in the context of German
reunification, in part because women in East Germany had been employed in
higher proportions than women in West Germany. In any case, as reflected in the
language of the night work case, many advocates of women's rights believed that
Article 3(2) went beyond Article 3(3) by imposing an affirmative duty on the
state to promote women's equal standing as a matter of social reality. If this
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. For a discussion of how this case read actual implementation of equal rights into Article
3(2), even before the 1994 amendment, see PETERS, supra note 124, at 161.
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meant that the state had a duty to promote women's advancement to achieve their
factual equality, some believed that this created a justiciable right to affirmative
action for women. At the very least, Article 3(2) appears to permit measures to
achieve factual equality. However, others continued to assert that Article 3(2)
did not go beyond Article 3(3), such that Article 3(3)'s prohibition of
discrimination was a mere restatement of what "equal rights" in Article 3(2)
required. Strictly construed, a prohibition of different treatment on the basis of
sex would not permit measures to promote equality if they distributed privileges
or burdens on the basis of sex.
The opportunity to clarify this debate emerged in the context of negotiating
German reunification in the early 1990s. Article 5 of the 1990 Treaty on
Reunification addressed future amendments to the Constitution. It recommended
that the legislative bodies of the United Germany consider constitutional
amendments on various subjects, including "considerations on introducing state
objectives into the Basic Law."135 Article 31 of the Unification Treaty, on
"Family and Women," declared, "It shall be the task of the all-German legislator
to develop further the legislation on equal rights for men and women."'136 It
continued: "In view of different legal and institutional starting positions with
regard to the employment of mothers and fathers, it shall be the task of the all-
German legislator to shape the legal situation in such a way as to allow
reconciliation of family and occupational life."' 3 7 The Joint Commission on
Constitutional Reform proposed an amendment that would nudge the legislator
to adopt public policies towards these goals. That amendment became the second
sentence of Article 3(2): "The State shall promote the actual implementation of
equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that
now exist."'
' 38
In the late 1990s, the Federal Constitutional Court for the reunified Germany
also recognized the disparate impact theory. The Court recognized disparate
impact as a theory of discrimination under Article 3(3) of the Basic Law. It cited
the European Court of Justice's indirect discrimination jurisprudence. Under
review was a pension scheme for Hamburg civil service employees that excluded
part-time workers who worked less than half of normal working hours. The
German Constitutional Court noted that Article 3(3) prohibited discrimination
on grounds of sex, and determined that sex discrimination can be present "when
135. Einigungsvertrag [Unification Treaty], Aug. 31, 1990, BGBL II, 885, 889 at art. 5 (Ger.).
136. Id. at art. 31(1).
137. Id. at art. 31(2).
138. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art. 3(2). Nonetheless, conflicts about the permissibility of gender
quotas continued through references and litigation before the European Court of Justice. The European
Court initially invalidated a civil service gender quota adopted in the German Land of Bremen, but later
upheld preferences for the underrepresented sex as long as the candidate was equally qualified and the
rejected male candidate had an opportunity to show that special circumstances tilted the balance in his
favor. See Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-03051; Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-06363; Badeck v. Hessen, 2000 E.C.R. 1-01875.
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a gender neutral regime mainly affects women and this is due to natural or social
differences between the sexes." 139 The Court then found that the statistical
evidence did not show that the percentage of women in the group of under-half-
time employees was greater than that in the more-than-half-time employees.
Nonetheless, the Court then resorted to the general equality guarantee in article
3(1), which guarantees equality to all persons without reference to sex or other
protected characteristics. Hamburg's pension scheme treated unequally two
classes of persons without sufficient justification, and therefore violated Article
3(1).
In 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court brought together the maternity
protection guarantee of Article 6(4) with the duty to reduce existing
disadvantages of Article 3(2), diminishing the formal guarantee of equality
before the law in Article 3(1). The 2006 decision held that mothers'
constitutional entitlement to protection of the state was violated when their time
on mandatory maternity leave was not taken into account in calculating the
qualifying period for their statutory unemployment insurance. 140 In Germany, the
maternity leave statute requires pregnant women to take maternity leave for six
weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth, during which they receive
maternity pay with contributions from both the employer and the state.141
However, this time was not treated as time worked for purposes of calculating
unemployment insurance eligibility. The Constitutional Court noted that this
framework violated the equality guarantee of Article 3(2) and 3(3). Because
mandatory maternity leave only affects women, "Article 3(2) of the Basic Law
imposes on the legislature an obligation to pass provisions that put women during
the prohibition of employment in the same position as if there were no
prohibition of employment."'
142
4. The Constitutional Rights Norm of Equal Rights: A Focus on Equal
Parenting
The second sentence of Article 3(2) regarding the "actual implementation"
of equal rights articulates what Robert Alexy calls a "constitutional rights
139. BVerfG, I BvL 12/91, Nov. 27, 1997,
http://sorminiserv.unibe.ch:8080/tools/ainfo.exe?Command=ShowPrintVersion&Name=bv097035.
140. BVERFG, IBvL 10/01, March 28, 2006,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2006/03/s200603 28 bvl001
001.html.
141. Whereas mandatory maternity leave is fairly common in European countries, including France,
requiring pregnant women to take leave has been held to violate due process in the United States. For a
discussion of this contrast, see Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26-27, 51-52 (2010); and Julie
C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in the United States and
Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 78 (2012).
142. BVERFG, 1BvL 10/01, supra note 140, at margin number 49.
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norm." 14 3 The equality of rights between men and women is a goal that the
government is directed by the Constitution to realize, and a principle that can
limit the exercise of other enforceable rights. 144 Individuals do not enforce an
entitlement to actual implementation of equality through the constitutional
complaints procedure, but the Constitutional Court can rely on the clause to limit
the scope of other constitutional rights that constitutional complainants can
invoke. Additional examples of government goals that function this way in
German constitutional enforcement include European integration, environmental
protection, and the principle of the social state. The constitutional principle of
"actual implementation of equal rights" thus clearly articulates a compelling state
interest, in American parlance, which can then be weighed when individuals
assert other enforceable constitutional entitlements, such as their right to equal
treatment under Article 3(1) and their right not to be favored or disfavored on
account of sex under Article 3(2).
Thus, the primary enforcer of the constitutional right to "actual
implementation of equal rights" is the legislature. In 1999, a Cabinet Resolution
invoked the state aim established in Article 3(2) to declare equality between men
and women to be a universal guiding principle for its actions. 145 In 2001, the
legislature adopted the Federal Equality Law on the Equality of Men and Women
in Federal Administration and Courts. 146 In departments where women are
underrepresented, women with equal qualifications must be given preferential
consideration for training, jobs, and promotions, taking individual circumstances
into account. The statute also established rights to part-time work and tele-work
to promote the compatibility of work and family life. It requires gender equality
plans within administrative units, including a stipulation that when a unit is
downsizing, its proportion of women must be maintained. More recently, the
German Parliament also adopted a law imposing gender quotas on corporate
boards of directors in March 2015.147 Germany joins Norway, France, the
143. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 362 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002).
144. See PETERS, supra note 124, at 162 (citing BVERFGE 85, 191, 209 (1992)).
145. See Kabinettbeschluss der Bundesregierung vom 23 Juni 1999 (Cabinet Resolution of the
Federal Governement of June 23, 1999) (Ger.). For a discussion of how this Cabinet Resolution invoked
the new gender equality amendment of 1994 as a constitutional principle that should guide legislative
action to promote gender equality, see Bundesministerium fir Familien, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend,
Strategic "Gender Mainstreaming," [Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth, "Gender
Mainstreaming" Strategy], Feb. 19, 2016,
https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/gleichstellung/gleichstellung-und-teilhabe/strategie-gender-
mainstreaming/strategie-gender-mainstreaming-/80436?view=DEFAULT.
146. Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und M5nnern in der Bundesverwaltung und in den
Gerichten des Bundes (Bundesgleichstellungsgesetz - BGleiG), Nov. 30, 2001, BGBI I at 3234,
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr id%3D%27bgbl 101 s3234.pdf"/o2
7%5D# bgbl %2F%2F*%5B%40attr id%3D%27bgbl 101 s3234.pd%/27%5D 1478738905246.
147. Gesetz flr die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Mannem an Fiihrungspositionen in
der Privatwirtschaft und im 6ffentlichen Dienst, Apr. 24, 2015,
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start--%2F%2F*%5B%40attr id%3D%27bgbl 15s0642.pdf/o2
7%5D# bgbl %2F%2F*%5B%40attr-id%3D%27bgbll 5s0642.pdfP/o27%5D 1478738671124.
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Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Spain in adopting some form of gender balance
rule for corporate boards. 148
As gender quotas aimed to increase women's participation in the economic
sphere, other new statutes aimed to increase men's participation in the family
caregiving sphere. The 1994 amendment has been the basis for recent
Constitutional Court decisions upholding these statutes against constitutional
challenges. The Federal Parental Benefit and Parental Leave Law149 adopted
various measures consciously intended to encourage fathers to take parental
leave so that men and women would share in caregiving more equally. The law
entitles new parents to twelve months of paid parental leave, which can be taken
by one parent or shared by the two. If the two parents share the leave, an
additional two months of paid leave become available. 15 In Germany, a parental
benefit is available upon birth of a child, regardless of whether the parent worked
before the birth of a child. Before the 2006 reform, the benefit was calculated on
a sliding scale basis, with higher benefits for lower-income families. Under the
2006 reform, the amount of the monthly allowance is calculated based on the
salary the parent taking the parental leave earned before the birth of the child. 151
A parent who did not work before the leave receives the minimum amount, but
a parent who is taking time off work gets a higher benefit according to salary. 152
The purpose is to incentivize the higher-wage parent-typically the father-to
take parental leave.
Another statutory intervention to encourage women's labor market
participation was the creation of a legally enforceable entitlement, as of 2013, to
a public daycare placement for any child over the age of twelve months.153 The
political discourse surrounding public daycare also invoked Germany's low birth
rates. The political agenda explicitly aimed at reconciling work-family conflict
in order to respond to the fertility crisis of "Shrinking Germany." As part of this
campaign, Chancellor Angela Merkel also promoted the lengthening of the
school day to enable more women to work full-time. Overall, legislative activity
to enforce the 1994 sex equality amendment has included affirmative action to
increase women's presence in the public and economic spheres, and measures to
increase men's presence in the family and private spheres.
The Federal Constitutional Court has explicitly linked policies that
encourage care of children by fathers and by public institutions to the
148. For accounts of corporate board gender quota laws, see AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING
BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY (2015); Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public
Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 449 (2012).
149. Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit (Bundeseltemgeld- und Elternzeitgesetz - BEEG),
Dec. 5, 2006, BGBL I, at 2748.
150. Id. §4.
151. BEEG,supra note 149, § 2, 7.
152. Id.§2, 5.
153. Sozialgesetzbuch [SGB VIII] [Social Code VIII], § 24 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/sgb_8/.
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constitutional duty to promote actual sex equality. In a pair of cases in 2011,
individual women complainants brought constitutional challenges against some
features of the 2006 parental leave reform, claiming that the law violated their
constitutional rights to equal treatment and family autonomy. In the first case, a
woman claimed that calculating the parental benefit based on the previous salary
of the parent taking leave amounted to an unjustified unequal treatment before
the law in violation of both Articles 3(1) and 3(2). 154 The legal theory sounds in
disparate impact: Since a neutrally formulated rule (benefit based on salary of
leave-taking parent) effectively lowers the benefit for women, in light of
women's greater likelihood of drawing a lower salary or no salary, the benefit
scheme is discriminatory. The Constitutional Court rejected her claim, viewing
the policy as incentivizing men to do more caregiving in order to reduce women's
disadvantages in the economic sphere and thus found no violation of 3(1) or 3(2).
In the next case challenging the 2006 Parental Benefit and Parental Leave
statute, 55 another mother challenged the policy of extending the length of leave
only if both parents take leave. She wanted to take the full fourteen months, and
argued that the 2006 law violated the constitutional protection of marriage and
the family because it conditioned the availability of the additional two months
on the father taking some leave. She argued that the baby, who was born pre-
term, needed special care that only she as the mother could provide. A lower
court had held that the state violated the married couple's constitutional right to
decide for themselves how to allocate care within the family in its efforts to
incentivize paternity leave. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected her claim,
noting that the state had a duty under Article 3(2) to implement actual equality
for men and women. The legislature could thus combat traditional gender roles
in the family. Because men were subject to social pressure based on traditional
gender roles against taking paternity leave, the policy was upheld as a vindication
of the legislature's duty.
156
Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court struck down a provision of the 2013
amendment to the Parental Benefit and Parental Leave Law, which provided a
childcare allowance of E 150 per month for any parent who took care of their
child at home from the ages of 15 to 36 months. That year, another change in law
created a legally enforceable entitlement of children to a placement in a public
daycare or preschool from the age of 12 months. The Federal Constitutional
Court held that, in light of the legally enforceable right to public daycare, the
federal government was not constitutionally competent to provide a childcare
allowance. The state of Hamburg, in challenging the federal childcare allowance,
noted that 94% of parents claiming the care allowance in lieu of public daycare
154. BVerfG, 1 BvR 2712/09, June 6, 2011,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rk20110606_lbvr271209.html.
155. Gesetz § 24 Abs. 2 Satz I SGB VIII (Ger.).
156. BVerfG, I BvL 15/11, Aug. 19, 2011, http://www.bverfg.de/elk20110819_lbvIO015 11.html.
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were women, and argued that the childcare allowance was contrary to Article
3(2) because it incentivized women to stay home to raise children. 157 The Court
rejected the childcare allowance based on the constitutional provisions
delineating federal power, but it is noteworthy that the litigants characterized the
outcome that prevailed as an implementation of the state's constitutional duty to
promote gender-equal parenting.
In recent cases on parental benefits, leave, and childcare, the litigants
unsuccessfully raised constitutional rights claims to parental autonomy. Under
Article 6(1) of the German Basic Law, marriage and the family are entitled to the
special protection of the state.158 The litigants claimed that this entitled parents
to decide for their family whether the father should take any parental leave, and
whether the mother should stay home instead of working and sending their baby
to daycare. Such family privacy claims resonate with the American jurisprudence
of Due Process.1 59 Nonetheless, the family privacy claims were unsuccessful
because they had to be balanced against the constitutional rights norm of "actual
implementation of equality for women and men" in Article 3(2). Since families
are given financial incentives to choose options that involve female labor market
participation and male caregiving, but without being coerced to do so, the
Constitutional Court saw the Article 6(1) entitlement as minimally compromised
and outweighed by the legislature's duty in Article 3(2). 160
B. France
The French constitution, like the German, contains all three features that
function to reduce gender inequalities: nondiscrimination, authorization of
special measures to promote sex equality, and protection of mothers. The 1946
Preamble guarantees equality in broad terms to men and women,' 61 and this has
been understood to embody an anti-sex-discrimination norm.' 62 France, like
Germany, amended its constitution in the 1990s to authorize measures like
gender quotas to address women's underrepresentation. The French constitution
also contains a postwar clause that articulates a duty on the part of the state to
157. BVerfG, I BvF 2/13, July 21, 2015, http://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20150721 lbvfOO0213.html.
158. Grundgesetz [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 6(1) (Ger.).
159. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). With regard to maternity leave, the U.S. Supreme Court held mandatory maternity leave to violate
Due Process, because "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Bd. of Educ. of Cleveland
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
160. See BVerfG, I BvR 2712/09, June 6, 2011,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rk201l0606_lbvr271209.html; BVerfG, 1 BvR 2712/09, June 6, 2011,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rk20110606 1 bvr271209.html.
161. 1958 CONST. 1946 Preamble (Fr.).
162. See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 81-133DC, Dec.
30, 1981 (Fr.).
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protect mothers. 163 Unlike the German Constitutional Court, the French
Constitutional Council has decided very few cases interpreting these
constitutional provisions with regard to sex equality, because individual and
post-hoc constitutional review were not available until the constitutional
amendment of 2008. That amendment coincided with an additional gender
equality amendment, which rewrote Article 1 to include the paragraph that
authorizes gender quotas: "The law shall promote equal access by men and
women to the elected offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and
social responsibility."'
64
1. Formal Constitutional Equality in 1982
In France, the constitutional amendments of 1999 and 2008 removed doubt
about the compatibility of gender-conscious interventions with other
constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. It is worth
rehearsing the history of these two amendments to understand why they were
thought to be necessary. The French constitution, in addition to the specific
mentions of equality between men and women in the 1946 Preamble and recent
amendments, contains other guarantees of equality. Article 6 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, a provision which is frequently invoked before the
Constitutional Council, provides:
The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right
to take part, personally or through their representatives, in its making. It
must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens,
being equal in its eyes, shall be equally eligible to all high offices, public
positions and employments, according to their ability, and without other
distinction than that of their virtues and talents.' 
65
Because Article 6 states that the law must be the same for all, whether it protects
or punishes, and makes all citizens equally eligible for public positions, the
Constitutional Council invoked it, along with other provisions on the
indivisibility of sovereignty, to strike down a gender quota law in 1982. 66 The
repudiated law had prohibited political parties from running more than seventy-
five percent of candidates of one gender in municipal elections.167
163. 1958 CONST. 1946 Preamble 11.
164. 1958 CONST. art. I (amended 2008).
165. 1789 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN art. 6.
166. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 82-146 DC, Nov. 18,
1982.
167. Id.
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2. Feminist Mobilization: From Antidiscrimination to Parity Democracy
Following the 1982 decision by the Constitutional Council, feminists
mobilized and created a strong public discourse challenging the
underrepresentation of women in Parliament.168 Whereas the proponents of the
1982 gender quota framed the law as a remedy for discrimination against female
politicians, the new discourse that developed in the late 1980s and throughout
the 1990s shifted the emphasis from discrimination to democracy. Article 1 of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man provides: "Men are born free and equal in
rights. Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the common
good."'169 The sex distinctions necessarily employed by a legislated gender quota
began to be framed as a social distinction that was premised on the common good
of a democratic republic that represents all of humanity. The new discourse of
parity envisioned humankind as consisting of two complementary halves-male
and female. A democracy lacking in parity between men and women would fail
to correspond to this natural and universal fact, and would thereby lack
legitimacy. The absence of democratic legitimacy is an obvious problem for state
institutions of governance, particularly the legislature, whose legitimacy clearly
depends on its ability to represent its constituents.
The 1999 amendment to the French constitution was an attempt to transform
the meaning of constitutional equality arrived at by the Constitutional Council in
1982. Thus, it focused on the issue of gender representation in elected office. The
1999 amendment authorized statutes to promote equal access by men and women
to the electoral mandate and elected offices. 17 The following year, legislation
was introduced to require gender parity in parties' selection of candidates. The
law prohibited a difference greater than one in the number of female and male
candidates. 171 This gender quota was also challenged by the political opposition
in 2000 on the grounds that a hard quota exceeded the legislature's authority to
promote equal access to elected offices. This time, the Constitutional Council
upheld the new quota, acknowledging that the 1999 Amendment permitted the
legislature to adopt strong measures, even those that departed from universalism,
168. A major book articulating the goals of this movement was FRANQOISE GASPARD, CLAUDE
SERVAN-SCHREIBER & ANNE LEGALL, Au POUVOIR, CITOYENNES! LIBERTE, EGALITE, PARITE (1989);
see also SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF THE SEXES (Lisa Walsh trans., 1999); JOAN SCOTT, PARITE!
(2002); Eric Millard, Constituting Women: The French Ways, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 122 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005).
169. 1789 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN art. 1.
170. Loi constitutionnelle 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative A l'6galit6 entre les femmes et les
hommes [Constitutional Law 99-569 of July 8, 1999 on Equality Between Women and Men], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN(:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 9, 1999, p. 10175.
171. Loi 2000-493 du 6juin 2000 tendant A favoriser l'gal accbs des femmes et des hommes aux
"mandats dlectoraux et fonctions electives [Law 2000-493 of June 6, 2000 Aiming to Promote Equal Access
by Women and Men to Electoral Mandates and Elected Positions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRAN(;AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 7, 2000, p. 8560, tit. I, arts. 1-8.
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to render effective the constitutionally prescribed norm of equal access by
women and men to the electoral mandate and elected office.'
1 72
Nonetheless, when the legislature adopted a law that imposed gender quotas
on corporate boards of directors in 2006,173 the Constitutional Council
invalidated it, reading the 1999 amendment as addressing equal access by men
and women only to the electoral domain, and not to other decisionmaking
powers. 174 It was in reaction to the 2006 Constitutional Council decision that the
more comprehensive amendment of 2008 was proposed, 7 5 authorizing the
legislature to promote equal access by women and men to positions of
professional and social responsibility, in addition to elected offices. Perhaps of
greater importance, albeit largely symbolic, is the placement of this
constitutional provision in Article 1 of the constitution, which declares the most
fundamental values by which the republic is constituted. Indeed, paragraph 1 of
Article 1 states: "France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social
republic. It shall ensure equality before the law, without distinction of origin,
race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organized on a
decentralized basis."' 176 The second paragraph then states: "Statutes shall
promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as
to professional and social positions."'
77
3. Legislating "Real Equality"
This 2008 amendment set off a flurry of legislative activity over the last few
years to promote gender equality. Almost immediately, a law requiring gender
• , .178
quotas on corporate boards of directors was reintroduced, very similar to the
one that was struck down in 2006. 179 The new statute, adopted in 2011, provided
that, by 2017, the proportion of board members of each sex could not be less than
172. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2000-429, May 30, 2000,
7.
173. Projet de loi relatif A l'6galit6 salariale entre les femmes et les hommes, adoptS, dans les
conditions pr~vues A l'article 45, alin~a 3, de la Constitution par l'Assemble nationale le 23 f~vrier 2006,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/egalitesalarialefemmes-hommes.asp.
174. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2006-533DC, Mar. 16,
2006.
175. Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve
R~publique (1), [Constitutional Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the Modernization of the Institutions
of the Fifth Republic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], July 24, 2008, p. 11890, art. 1.
176. 1958 CONST. art. 1, 1 (amended 2008).
177. Id.
178. Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative A la representation 6quilibr~e des femmes et des
hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et A l'6galitd professionnelle (1), [Law
2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the balanced representation of women and men on administrative and
supervisory boards and on professional equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANiAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680.
179. See Projet de loi relatif A l'6galit6 salariale entre les femmes et les hommes, supra note 173.
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40%. 180 Several statutes and regulations that imposed gender quotas in many
other decisionmaking bodies followed. For example, a 2012 law provided that
various civil service governing bodies could not be less than 40% of each sex. 181
A 2013 statute reforming higher education provided that certain committees
within higher education institutions had to achieve parity between women and
-. 182
men in composition. Also in 2013, the existing parity rules in regional and
municipal elections were strengthened, requiring political parties' candidate lists
to strictly alternate male-female in a wider range of elections.
1 83
In 2014, the French legislature adopted a comprehensive gender equality
statute,' 84 asserting a mandate emanating from the 2008 constitutional
amendment.1 85 The statute, on "Real Equality Between Women and Men,"
included an expansion of abortion rights, measures to reduce the gender pay gap,
reform of parental leave to incentivize equal caregiving by fathers and mothers,
aid to victims of violence against women, and gender balance rules in new
institutional settings where they had not previously applied. A Senate report
introducing the legislation begins by pointing to the constitutional promise of sex
equality in Article 3 of the 1946 Preamble.1 86 This provision, in addition to the
2008 amendment and several EU directives, are cited as sources of a legislative
mandate to adopt a comprehensive approach to gender equality in all the many
different domains of social, political, and economic life in which sex inequality
is produced. 187 The most significant reforms in this statute, on "professional
equality between women and men," address the disadvantaging effects of
women's disproportionate share of work within families and households on
women's careers.1 88 Thus, there are many new provisions, largely inspired by
180. SeeLoi2011-lO3du27janvier2011,supranote 178, atart. 1.
181. Loi 2012-347 du 12 mars 2012 relative 5 l'acc~s l'emploi titulaire et A l'am~lioration des
conditions d'emploi des agents contractuels dans la fonction publique, A la lutte contre les discriminations
et portant diverses dispositions relatives A la fonction publique [Law 2012-347 of March 12, 2012 on
Tenured Employment and the Improvement of Employment Conditions of Contractual Agents in the Civil
Service, on the Fight Against Discrimination and Imposing Various Measures Relating to the Civil
Service], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANIAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar.
13, 2012, p. 5598, at art. 52-56.
182. Loi 2013-660 du 22 juillet 2013 relative A l'enseignement sup6rieur et A la recherche (1), [Law
2013-660 of July 22, 2013 on Higher Education and Research (])], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBL1QUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jul. 23, 2013, p. 12235, at art. 50.
183. Loi 2013-403 du 17 mai 2013 relative A l'6lection des conseillers d~partementaux, des
conseillers municipaux et des conseillers communautaires, et modifiant le calendrier electoral, [Law 2013-
403 of May 17, 2013 on the Election of Regional Councilmembers, Municipal Councilmembers, and
Community Councilmembers, and Modifying the Electoral Calendar], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], J.O., Mar. 18, 2013, p. 8242, at art. 3.
184. Loi 2014-873 du 4 aofit 2014 pour l'6galit6 r~elle entre les femmes et les hommes (1) [Law
2014-873 of August 4, 2014 for Real Equality Between Women and Men (1)], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2014, p. 12949.
185. Etude d'impact, Projet de loi pour l'6galit6 entre les femmes et les hommes, NOR:
DFEX1313602L/Bleue-1 (July 1, 2013), at 1.1.1 (justifying the bill that was eventually adopted in 2014
as an implementation of the 2008 constitutional amendment).
186. Seeid. at5, 15.
187. Id. at 15.
188. Loi 2014-873, supra note 184, tit. 1.
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policies that have been successful in Scandinavian countries and now in
Germany, which lengthen paternity leaves and incentivize fathers to take them.
Many provisions of the statute, grouped in Title V, impose gender parity rules in
new domains, such professional sports organizations, and strengthen
mechanisms of enforcing existing political party quotas. 1
89
The statute includes an abortion reform, which is presented as a measure to
promote equality between women and men in professional life. Article 24, in
Title I of the statute, amends the abortion law within the Code of Public Health.
The Public Health Code had, since 1973, permitted abortion on demand within
the first trimester, as long as the pregnant woman certified that the pregnancy put
her in "a situation of distress."' 190 The reform at Article 24 abolishes the distress-
certification requirement in first trimester abortions, and authorizes abortions in
the first trimester for any woman "who does not want to continue a
pregnancy."
'191
Title II, on "the fight against insecurity," contains, inter alia, special pension
benefits for single working parents and financial support for nannies employed
by low-income families. 192 Title III aids victims of violence as well as victims of
"attacks on dignity and image in communications based on sex." 193 Title IV, "on
equality between women and men in their relations with the administration,"
entitles each person to be addressed by administrative authorities by his or her
"family name," which, under French civil law, is a person's last name at birth.' 94
4. Not a Fundamental Right: Parity as Principle
In April 2015, the French Constitutional Council issued an important ruling
construing "equal access by men and women" in the 2008 amendment to Article
1. The Constitutional Council declared that "equal access by women and men to
professional and social positions" articulated a constitutional goal to be realized
by the legislature, and did not create individually justiciable rights. The
Constitutional Council articulated this view in the course of ruling on a
constitutional complaint brought by opponents of a statutory gender quota that
had been added to the Education Code in 2013, requiring gender balance on
189. Id., tit. V.
190. C. SANTE PUBLIQUE, art. L 2212-1 (2013).
191. With regard to abortion funding, it should be noted that a 2012 statute authorized 100%
reimbursement by the state for all legally permitted abortions. The same statute entitles young people age
15 to 18 to free contraception. See Loi 2012-1404 du 17 d6cembre 2012 de financement de la s6curit6
sociale pour 2013 [Law 2012-1404 of December 17, 2012 on Social Security Funding for 2013], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 18, 2012, p. 19821,
at art. 50, 52.
192. See Loi 2014-873, supra note 184, tit. II.
193. Id.,tit. 111.
194. See id, tit. IV art. 59. This provision prohibits communications from public institutions from
addressing any person by a married name ("nom d'usage") unless the concerned person herself uses the
married name in written communications.
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certain university committees. Individual suits challenging the constitutionality
of quotas, brought by persons claiming to be injured by quotas, are a new
phenomenon. Due to constitutional reforms of 2008 that occurred simultaneously
with the aforementioned gender parity amendment, any individual litigant or
criminal defendant may now claim that the application of a statute in his or her
case is unconstitutional by utilizing a process called "question prioritaire de
constitutionnalit6" (QPC). 195
The first QPC action challenging the constitutionality of a gender quota was
brought against a minor provision of the Education Code, adopted in 2013, which
requires certain university governance committees to be gender-balanced. An
organization of university presidents challenged the provision, invoking the
equality guaranteed by Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, as well
as other constitutional principles. The Constitutional Council upheld the gender
quota, 196 holding that it was permitted pursuant to Article l's command that
"[s]tatutes shall promote equal access by women and men to .. .positions of
professional ... responsibility."
' 197
The 2013 statute on higher education had only imposed gender parity rules
on some, but not all, university governance committees. The statute had
generally restructured university governance to consist of several different
committees. One of the committees was of a "limited" or ad hoc nature, to be
constituted to deliberate on the careers of non-professor researchers (essentially
postdoctoral lecturers). For committees formed for this purpose, the statute
required "double parity"-an equal number of professors and lecturers, and an
equal number of men and women.
The Constitutional Council, in upholding the parity rule, noted that Article
6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man established a principle of equality that
was not opposed to legislation that treated different situations differently, nor to
derogations of equality for the common good, provided that the resulting
differences of treatment would have a direct correspondence to the purpose of
the law that established them. The Constitutional Council was, indeed, repeating
language that is found in almost all of its decisions about Article 6. Then, the
Constitutional Council identified the purpose of the law as "promoting the equal
access of women and men to positions of professional responsibility" with which
the parity rule had a direct relationship.
But the more interesting part of the Constitutional Council's decision
consisted of remarks obliquely directed at the intervenors in the QPC
proceedings. Although interventions are rare in QPC proceedings to date, the
Constitutional Council had authorized an intervention in this action by fifteen
195. See 1958 CONST. art. 61-1 (amended 2008).
196. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2015-465QPC, Apr. 24,
2015 (Fr.).
197. See id. 13.
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academic researchers, some professors and other lecturers, who were members
of REG1NE, a research group on law and gender. 98 REGINE's brief to the
Constitutional Council argued that the 2008 amendment putting equal access by
women and men to leadership positions in Article 1 of the constitution had
established gender parity as a "foundational rule." What this meant was that (1)
Article 1 had to be read as a blanket authorization to Parliament to adopt
measures favoring equal access by women and men,1 99 essentially validating
gender quotas in all domains of social and professional life, and (2) the
legislature had an obligation to promote equal access by women and men in
university governance committees.
On the second point, the intervenors argued that, if anything, the statute was
unconstitutional because it did not go far enough in promoting gender parity. The
statute only imposed gender parity on committees limited to deliberating on the
careers of lecturers, and not on committees deliberating on the careers of
professors. The intervenors recited the Constitutional Council's longstanding
equality jurisprudence, which permits different treatment of different situations,
as long as the difference of treatment is justified by the law's purpose. Here, the
difference of treatment between professors and lecturers could not be justified
by the purpose of the law, given that their situations were identical and that the
purpose of the law was to promote equal access by women and men to
professional positions.
Without much explanation, the Constitutional Council rejected the
intervenors' argument. The Constitutional Council simply noted that the law can
justifiably treat two committees differently when they are differently situated.
Since one committee dealt with lecturers' careers, and the other dealt with
professors' careers, there was no equality problem in having different rules for
each committee. In effect, the Constitutional Court was rejecting the intervenors'
attempt to invoke the 2008 "equal access" amendment to render a statute
unconstitutional for its failure to impose more gender parity rules than it had.
The Constitutional Council took the opportunity to declare Article 1 to be a
constitutional principle, rather than an individual constitutional right that could
be enforced pursuant to the QPC procedure, saying: "this provision did not create
a right or liberty that the constitution guarantees; such that its misapprehension
therefore cannot be invoked to support a preliminary question of
constitutionality. ' '20 Thus, the recent constitutionalization of gender equality is
a foundational republican principle or goal, and not an individual right.
198. REGINE is an acronym for Recherches et Etudes sur le Genre et les In6galit6s dans les Normes
en Europe. Consisting largely of feminist law professors, the group is based at the Universit6 de Paris
Ouest Nanterre. See REGINE, http://regine.u-parisl 0.fr.
199. REGINE Brief at 4-5, Conseil Constitutionnel decision No. 2015-465 QPC, Apr. 24, 2015 (on
file with author).
200. Conseil Constitutionnel decision No. 2015-465QPC, supra note 196, at 14.
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This statement is mysterious and unnecessary to the Constitutional Council's
decision to uphold the quota. After all, the QPC claimants themselves were not
invoking Article 1 as the source of the rights they alleged to be violated; they
were relying on Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The
intervenors invoked Article I's parity provision, but they were intervenors, not
claimants. More importantly, the intervenors, too, premised their constitutional
rights claim primarily on Article 6, not on Article 1. They claimed that, contrary
to Article 6 of the Declaration, the statute had treated similarly situated persons
(professors and researchers) differently by not imposing parity on committees
dealing with professors, without justification. Their legal argument never
encompassed the claim that the parity amendment in Article 1 entitled them to
parity in all possible situations.
Thus, the Constitutional Council's statement-that parity is not a
fundamental right-is superfluous, perhaps a warning to future claimants not to
challenge statutes for failing to impose gender balance rules if Article 1 is their
only constitutional source. By rejecting the intervenors' Article 6 argument, the
Constitutional Council is implicitly holding that Article 6 should not be invoked
as a vehicle for invalidating the legislature's interpretation of Article 1. One
implication is that future QPC attempts to rely on Article 6, not only by feminists
demanding more gender quotas but also by opponents of gender quotas
demanding a narrower reading of Article 1, will not be admissible. What this
suggests is that the French constitutionalization of gender parity is primarily an
enumeration of legislative power and priorities. A powerful transformation has
occurred, in reconceptualizing gender parity as a condition to be attained so that
the constitutional order of a democratic republic can flourish, rather than an
individual right. This idea can inform the way American feminists imagine the
political and legal function of Equal Rights Amendments in state and federal
constitutions.
IV. BR1NGING GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM HOME
A. Completing the Revolution in Social Reproduction
In the three decades since the ERA's demise in the United States,
constitutional orders outside of the United States have updated and refined the
meaning of constitutional sex equality in ways that respond directly to the
ultimate goals of today's ERA proponents. American ERA revivalists believe
that the ERA will strengthen the tools of antidiscrimination doctrine to disrupt
the persistence of the gendered division of labor within the family, pay inequity,
women's underrepresentation in leadership positions, and the failure to
accommodate pregnancy in the workplace. Yet, the prescribed legal apparatus
for the ERA is ill-matched to the remaining manifestations of women's
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disadvantage. Strict scrutiny would make the law more gender-neutral and
remove stereotypes from the law, but the absence of official stereotypes does not
end gendered norms and cultural practices. Even in legal regimes that make paid
parental leave available on gender-neutral terms to both mothers and fathers,
uptake by mothers is significantly higher than uptake by fathers. 201 This is why
Sweden introduced incentives to encourage fathers to take leave, which Germany
copied. Even when fathers take some leave, they take less than mothers.
To address these problems, carefully designed and well-funded public
policies are needed: paid parental leave designed to be attractive to men,
paycheck fairness rules that explicitly prohibit the setting of wages based on
gender-unequal factors like previous salary, affordable high-quality childcare
and afterschool programs, and norms of diversity and gender balance in major
institutions of power, to name a few. An updated constitutional sex equality
amendment could help engender or protect these institutional supports for
gender-equal families and economies. As presently conceptualized on the federal
level and practiced on the state level, the legal framework of the ERA primarily
refines and strengthens the tools of antidiscrimination law, such as doctrines of
strict scrutiny and disparate impact.202 The de facto ERA and state jurisprudence
have imposed heightened scrutiny on sex classifications, and federal statutes and
some state ERAs have applied disparate impact theory. An ERA thus conceived
would be primarily symbolic, and function legally as a fine-tuner, not a
transformer. It is hard to gather up the steam to amend the Constitution for such
subtle gains. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine getting the consensus
required under Article V to amend the Constitution for more drastic changes.
But as the European experience illustrates, a constitutional sex equality
amendment can be more than a fine-tuner, and less than a revolution. Consider
the concerns of the ERA revival together with the work of legal feminists over
the last two decades, the rising social movement of mothers' organizations, and
the proliferation of state laws addressing work-family conflict in the past decade.
They focus on the same problems addressed by European gender
constitutionalism since the 1990s. By lining up these piecemeal and multifaceted
developments in the United States with the projects of constitutional sex equality
amendments in Germany and France, we can begin to imagine a new role for the
ERA.
European gender constitutionalism from the 1990s to the present is best
understood as the completion of a quiet revolution that has been occurring in the
201. In Finland, for example, fathers take less than 9% of the total of all parental leave, even though
the leaves are available to both genders. In addition, Finland offers a "daddy month," a paternity allowance
available to fathers for 25 days to take leave concurrently while the mother is on parental leave. As of
2012, only 32% of fathers took the extra "daddy month." See EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, PROMOTING UPTAKE OF PARENTAL AND
PATERNITY LEAVE AMONG FATHERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-3 (2015).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 16 to 24.
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economies of wealthy democracies since the late twentieth century. 20 3 These
economies now depend on women's participation in the labor market, which
destabilizes women's role as full-time caregivers within the family and leaves a
gap in the society's presumed arrangements for raising the next generation of
citizens. Enlightenment constitutions assumed that women would be excluded
from suffrage and from full economic citizenship so that they could devote
themselves to the important task of reproducing (both biologically and socially)
204the next generation of constitutional subjects. But today, average American
middle-class families cannot afford housing, education, healthcare, and other
basic costs unless both parents work.20 5 Such societies require new arrangements
by which the next generation gets raised and households get maintained. These
arrangements constitute what I refer to as the infrastructure of social
reproduction, and every society constituted by a constitution needs to have one
in order to ensure its continued existence.
Past economies that did not depend on women's participation in the labor
market depended on women at home raising children. That was the infrastructure
of social reproduction silently embedded in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
constitutions. Alexis de Tocqueville, observing the early American republic,
noted, "Almost all men in democracies are engaged in public or professional life;
and on the other hand the limited income obliges a wife to confine herself to the
house in order to watch in person, and very closely, over the details of the
domestic economy. ' 206 Women's constitutional exclusion from suffrage and
civil rights is therefore logically connected to the economy's reliance on
women's devotion to the tasks of social reproduction-the raising of the next
generation of full constitutional citizens. Known as the "separate spheres"
tradition, this infrastructure of social reproduction was not explicitly described
in constitutions before the late twentieth century, but its place in the legal order
was affirmed in judicial decisions interpreting those constitutions. In the United
States, Justice Bradley's now-infamous concurrence in Bradwell v. State
justified women's exclusion from "adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of [their] husband[s]" as consistent with Equal Protection and Due
Process, because "the domestic sphere" and "the family institution" belonged to
203. Sociologist Gosta Esping-Anderson has shown that the revolution in women's roles is
incomplete in the sense that women have increased their participation in market work without a
proportionate decrease in their share of family caregiving and household work. See GOSTA ESPING-
ANDERSON, THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION: ADAPTING TO WOMEN'S NEW ROLES 19-54 (2009).
204. See Ruth Rubio Marin, The [Dis]establishment of Gender: Care and Gender Roles in the
Family as a Constitutional Matter, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 787 (2015).
205. Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi noted in 2003 that the average American middle-
class family can no longer buy a home unless both parents work. Although the average two-income family
earns more now than did the single-breadwinner family with a stay-at-home mom a generation ago, the
costs of housing, education, healthcare, and other basic costs of raising children require both paychecks.
WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 35, at 8.
206. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 207 (Henry Reeve trans., 1994).
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the "domain and functions of womanhood." 20 7 In Germany, even after the
Constitution guaranteed equal rights to women, the Constitutional Court upheld
a law limiting women's working hours because of women's functional difference
from men as primary caretakers.
208
The German Constitutional Court's sex equality jurisprudence then moved
on to dismantling sex classifications that reinforced women's traditional roles in
the family. The de facto ERA in the United States, driven by the 1970s legal
feminist agenda of ridding the law of sex stereotypes about women's roles as
dependents and caregivers in the family, operated similarly. But more recently,
the German interpretation of constitutional sex equality is moving beyond
dismantling the old infrastructure towards articulating and supporting a new one.
The legislature invoked the 1994 sex equality amendment when it legislated
gender quotas in the civil service, and the Constitutional Court invoked it to
uphold paternity leave incentives against allegations of unconstitutional equal
rights violations. In France, social movements successfully achieved
constitutional amendments that made gender parity a fundamental principle of
the republic, which led to the legislative adoption of a comprehensive "real
equality" agenda, strengthening abortion rights, implementing gender quotas for
a wide range of decisionmaking positions, and creating incentives for fathers to
take paternity leave. The French Constitutional Council has also relied on gender
equality as a fundamental republican principle and as a shield against individual
constitutional rights claims challenging the sex classifications in gender quotas.
These new amendments have made sex equality into a constitutional goal rather
than an enforceable individual right against discrimination. This enables the
legislature to build the new infrastructure of social reproduction, which courts
can defend against attacks by individuals attempting to vindicate formal equality
rights.
B. The American Infrastructure of Social Reproduction in the States
Twenty-first-century post-industrial societies need updated institutional
arrangements for raising the next generation of citizens. To operate efficiently
and to enable society to flourish, our institutions must fit the lives of the people
they serve. Today, citizens of all genders participate equally in democratic
governance and market work. If a society consisting of such citizens is also
committed to reproducing and raising future generations, new institutional
arrangements are needed. The new infrastructure of social reproduction has at
least four essential components that are being pursued piecemeal in the United
States, largely in the states and municipalities. They include the accommodation
of pregnancy in the workplace, paid parental leave, education designed for the
207. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
208. BVERFGE 3, 225 (1953), 42; see discussion supra Section II.A. 1.
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children of two breadwinners, and employment designed for coequal parents.
These components need to be put together and buttressed. Like roads, pipes, and
public transportation, the education and care of children can be conceptualized
as an infrastructure on which the economy and social life of a constitutional order
depends.
1. Pregnancy Accommodation
Women's unequal economic status stems in part from their unwanted
separation from work during pregnancy. In European countries, strong
protections for pregnant workers include prohibitions on dismissal, even for
cause, accommodation of job tasks, -and mandatory maternity leave shortly
before and after childbirth. 20 9 In the United States, the federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act simply prohibits discrimination against pregnant workers; it
does not require employers to accommodate pregnancy unless the employer
210accommodates other similarly disabling conditions.
To overcome the limits of federal pregnancy discrimination law, states and
localities are imposing more robust duties on employers. Due to the inadequacies
of the federal antidiscrimination approach to the employment disadvantages of
pregnancy, fifteen states have adopted laws requiring the reasonable
211 212 213accommodation of pregnancy: Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, 2 14 Hawaii, 215 Illinois, 2 16 Louisiana, 2 1 Maryland
2 8 Minnesota 2 19
220 221 222 223 224Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
225 226Texas, and West Virginia. In addition, local governments, including the
209. These requirements are stipulated by a European directive on the safety and health of pregnant
workers. See Council Directive 92/85, art. 5, 8, 10, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1, 2 (EC).
2 10. Despite the decision in favor of the plaintiff to allow her past the summary judgment stage,
the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United Parcel Service affirms this understanding of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Young v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1350 (2015).
211. ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520 (2013).
212. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11049 (2016).
213. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-60(a)(7), 46a-51 (2011).
214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711, 716 (2016).
215. HAW. CODER. §§ 12-46-107 (2016).
216. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-101, 102 (2014).
217. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:342, 23-341 (1997).
218. MD. CODE, STATE GOV'T, §§ 20-609, 20-601 (2013).
219. MINN. STAT. §§ 181.940, 181.9414, 181.9436 (2014).
220. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1107.01(2), 48-1107.02 (2015).
221. N.J. STAT § 10:5-12(s) (2013).
222. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21)(e)-(f), 296(2)(e) (McKinney 2016).
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03(2) (2015).
224. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7.4(a) (2015).
225. The Texas statute applies to county and municipal employers. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 180.004 (2016).
226. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-1 lb-1, et seq. (2014).
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227 228 229 230District of Columbia, Philadelphia, New York City, and Providence,
have also enacted reasonable accommodation laws for pregnant workers. Most
of these statutes were passed in the last five years. Of the states that have pregnant
worker fairness statutes, every single one has either ratified the federal ERA or
adopted a state ERA. Notably, eight of these states (including Pennsylvania,
where Philadelphia has adopted a pregnant worker statute) have ratified the
federal ERA and adopted a state constitutional ERA.23 '
2. Paid Parental Leave
Paid parental leave for both mothers and fathers is an essential component
of the infrastructure of care that is necessary to support women and men's equal
participation in economic and political life. The federal Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) guarantees unpaid leave for employees of large employers.
Only twelve percent of private sector workers have access to paid family leave
through their employer.
232
States have taken the lead in legislating paid parental leave. California led
the way in 2002. 233 New Jersey followed in 2008234 and Rhode Island in 2013.
235
All three states that have legislated and implemented paid parental leave are
states which have ratified the federal ERA and adopted state ERAs. Washington
(which ratified the federal ERA and has a state ERA) also adopted a paid parental
leave statute in 2007,236 but the program has yet to be implemented. New York
State passed legislation in April 2016 adopting twelve-week paid family leave
benefits, which will go into effect in 2018. 23 Local governments are also
adopting paid leave policies: The mayor of New York City recently signed an
executive order requiring nonunion employers to provide six weeks of paid
parental leave at 100 percent pay.238 In April 2016, San Francisco also enacted
six weeks of fully paid parental leave, which will eventually cover all employees
227. D.C. CODE § 32-1231 (2016).
228. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1128 (2014).
229. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(22)(a) (2015).
230. PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE ORDINANCES § 16-(b)(1)(c), 16-57(c)(1)(f)-(g) (2015).
231. See infra tbl.2.
232. See U.S. DEP'T LAB., DOL FACTSHEET: PAID FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (June 2015),
http://www.dol.gov/wb/PaidLeave/PaidLeave.htm.
233. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-06 (West 2016).
234. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-37 et. seq.
235. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-34 et. seq.
236. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 49-86.005-86.903 (West 2016).
237. Assemb. 9006-C, Leg. 20 1st Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
238. See Michael M. Grynbaum, New York to Offer 6 Weeks Paid Parental Leave to Nonunion
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/nyregion/new-york-to-offer-
6-weeks-paid-parental-leave-to-nonunion-workers.html.
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working for more than 180 days for an employer with more than twenty
employees.
239
3. Childcare and Educationfor Children of Breadwinners
The third important component of the infrastructure of social reproduction,
which must be coordinated with paid parental leave, is an education system
designed for children of two parents of any gender who are both full participants
in economic and political citizenship. Would that education system look
anything like the one we inherited from the era of separate spheres? For example,
would formal education, provided by the public school system, begin at the age
of five or six? To some degree, an education system designed for the children of
two breadwinners depends on other aspects of the infrastructure, such as paid
parental leave.
In the United States, Congress passed the Comprehensive Child
Development Act in 1971, 24 which would have created nationally funded,
locally administered, comprehensive childcare centers providing quality
education, nutrition, and medical services, open to all on a sliding-scale fee basis.
Four months before Congress passed the ERA, President Nixon vetoed the
childcare bill,241 arguing that it would diminish the role of families in raising
children, and channeling the same sentiments that enabled the Stop-ERA
movement to succeed. Almost half a century later, President Obama called for
universal pre-kindergarten in his 2013 State of the Union Address. 242 Meanwhile,
states have been creating the right to pre-kindergarten education, with strong
243 244bipartisan support. Forty-five states provide some funding for preschool.
Florida, for example, amended its constitution in 2002 to entitle every four-year-
old to be offered a voluntary pre-K program.245 Georgia and Oklahoma also aim
to offer universal pre-K for all four-year-olds. 246 In other states, publicly funded
preschool does not serve all eligible children and typically limits enrollment to
239. See Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Approves Fully Paid Parental Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20 16/04/06/us/san-francisco-approves-fully-paid-parental-leave.html.
240. Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, S. 1512, 92nd Cong. (1971).
241. Veto Message from Richard Nixon, 387 -Veto of the Economic Opportunity Amendments of
1971(Dec. 9, 1971) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3251.
242. See Early Learning, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/early-
childhood.
243. EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, 50-STATE REVIEW 1 (Jan. 2016),
http://www.ecs.org/ec-content/uploads/01252016 Prek-K Funding report revised 02022016.pdf
(noting that 32 states increased state funding for pre-K programs in 2015-16, of which 22 states had
Republican governors and 10 states had Democratic governors).
244. Id.
245. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
246. See Mike Bostock, Shan Carter & Kevin Quealy, State-Financed Preschool Access in the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/20l3/02/14/education/early-education-far-short-
of-goal-in-obama-speech.html. Florida and Oklahoma have the highest percentages of four-year-olds
enrolled in state preschool programs, at 76% and 7 3 % respectively.
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low-income children. 247 Note that none of three leading states on universal pre-
K have ratified the federal ERA, and two of them lack a state ERA. This
illustrates the extent to which support for childcare and early education is
unmoored from the women's equality agenda. Once equal rights for women are
understood to engender a modern infrastructure of social reproduction, the
dynamics of national consensus might shift.
4. Structuring Workfbr Coequal Parents and Caregivers
There is also an after-school childcare gap for school-age children when both
parents work full-time. A school day that ends at 3:00 p.m. made sense in the old
infrastructure, which assumed that the non-working mother would be available
to care for children between the end of the school day and the end of the standard
workday. A workday that ends a few hours after school ends is also part of the
old infrastructure of social reproduction, which assumed that one parent need not
work a standard workday. The relationship between the length of the school day
and the length of the workday needs to be rethought to equalize men's and
women's shares of market work and caregiving.
This brings us to the fourth component of the infrastructure of social
reproduction: a system of employment designed for workers who are also co-
parenting equally. If employment policy assumed that the typical worker is
raising children without depending on a partner to provide as much unpaid
caregiving support as needed, how would jobs, including schedules and wages,
be structured? 248 One's answer to this question depends in part on how the other
components of the infrastructure, such as education, would be designed. If the
school day is lengthened, the current norm of 9:00-5:00 jobs need not change.
However, if the school day remains roughly the same, different employment
arrangements such as flex-time, comp time, and job sharing would be necessary
for two breadwinners to also fulfill their family responsibilities.
Workplace flexibility laws are emerging at the state and local level in the
United States. In 2013, Vermont adopted a law that entitles employees to request
a flexible working arrangement, and requires the employer to discuss and
consider such requests at least twice a year. Although the law does not require
the employer to grant requests when reasonable, it requires the employer to
247. See Sara Mead, The Building Blocks of Success: Clearing up common misconceptions about
state pre-K programs can lead to better outcomes for our kids, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jun. 15,
2015), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/06/26/setting-the-record-straight-on-
state-pre-k-programs.
248. Joan Williams argues that the ideal worker norm, including the nine-to-five workday, is
designed around masculine norms. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY WORK AND FAMILY
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 64-100 (2000). Vicki Schultz and Allison Hoffman argue that a
reduced workweek would alleviate work-family conflict without exacerbating the gendered division of
labor in the workplace and in family caregiving. See Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a
Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY
(Judith Fudge & Rosemary Owen eds., 2006).
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discuss the request in good faith, and provides the employer with factors the
employer may consider.249 San Francisco adopted a law with very similar terms
and requirements. It protects employees from retaliation for requesting flexible
work arrangements. 250
The achievement of gender balance in management and decision-making
positions could also play a role in structuring the workplace for coequal parents
and caregivers. Institutions that achieve gender balance must confront the fact
that a critical mass of their participants will be primary or coequal caregivers.
When there are a few token women, it is possible for the institution to continue
to operate on the assumption that every participant is available full-time, without
caregiving responsibilities, and the women most likely to succeed in such
institutions are typically not mothers. But once women are in the public sphere
in sufficiently large proportions, as German leaders recently recognized, a
fertility crisis may ensue if working full-time is incompatible with raising a
family. Thus, the social order must devise an alternative infrastructure of social
reproduction, and there are many models and approaches from which to choose.
Gender-balanced leadership catalyzes the process by which the alternative
• 251
employment regime emerges.
Laws requiring gender balance in any institutional setting are also more
likely to emerge and be upheld at the state level. Indeed, some fourteen states in
the United States have statutes that require gender balance on the state, county,
or city committees of major political parties: Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
252Wyoming. All but two of these states (Missouri and South Carolina) have
either ratified the federal ERA or adopted a state ERA or both.253 While these
statutes only apply to political party committees, they suggest the legal
possibility in the states of legislating gender balance.
These statutes were first adopted in the period before and after the adoption
and ratification of the woman's suffrage amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
254
249. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 309 (2013).
250. S.F., CAL, SAN FRANCISCO FAMILY FRIENDLY WORKPLACE ORDINANCE, Ord. 209-13, File
No. 130785 (App. 10/9/2013, Eff. 11/8/2013, Oper. 1/1/2014).
251. 1 have developed this theory in more detail in Julie C. Suk, Work-Family Conflict and the
Pipeline to Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1805.
252. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.091 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3801 (2016); LA. STAT.
ANN.- Rev. Stat. 18:443.1 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 52, § 1 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
168.597 (West 2016); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.607 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-28-201 (2016);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:5-3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 248.015 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-9-90 (2016);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 2-13-103 (2016); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 171.002 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §
29A.80.020 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-9 (2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 8.17 (West 2015); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4-101 (2016).
253. See infra Table 3.
254. See KRISTI ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 77-109 (1996); Jo FREEMAN, A ROOM AT A TIME: HOW WOMEN ENTERED
PARTY POLITICS 110 (2000); Marguerite J. Fisher, Women in the Political Parties, in 251 ANNALS OF THE
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While some state courts struck down these equal representation provisions on
various federal constitutional grounds,255 including Equal Protection and even
the Nineteenth Amendment itself,256 some state courts have upheld them on
257
either the same grounds or state constitutional grounds .
One state case, Marchioro v. Chaney, illustrates how a state ERA can form
the normative foundation of state legislation to achieve gender equality. 258 The
Washington Supreme Court upheld its statutory gender quota on state political
party committees, providing a long and detailed discussion of the quota's
relationship to the state's ERA. Both male and female members of the
Democratic Party challenged this statute on various federal and state
constitutional grounds. 259 They argued, inter alia, that the 50-50 sex division led
to exclusions based on sex and thus violated Washington State's Equal Rights
Amendment. The Washington Supreme Court rejected their claims, and
suggested instead that the constitutional amendment encouraged the government
to promote "actual" equality for women. The court held that Washington's pre-
ERA approach of applying heightened scrutiny to sex classifications had been
"swept away" by the ERA.2 6 0 The ERA did not make the government "powerless
to take measures designed to assure women actual as well as theoretical equality
of rights. ' 26 1 The court then concluded, "This is precisely the purpose of this
legislation." 262 Thus, in addition to finding that the statute did not violate the
ERA, it also suggested that the statute vindicated the ERA's underlying purpose:
What has been done to assure women actual as well as theoretical
equality of these rights? The legislature has found that in the conduct of
the offices of state committees there shall be an absolute equality of
rights between the sexes. An equal number of both sexes must be elected
to the committee and as chairman and vice chairman of the state
committee. Neither sex may predominate. Neither may discriminate or
be discriminated against. There is an equality of numbers and an
equality of rights to be in office' and to control the affairs of the state
committee. The ironic result of plaintiffs' theory would be to abolish a
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 87 (May 1947); Emily Newell Blair, Women
in the Political Parties, in 143 ANNALS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 217, 223 (May
1929).
255. E.g., Hartman v. Mintz, 303 N.J. Super. 326 (1997).
256. E.g., In re Cavellier, 159 Misc. 212 (N.Y. 1936).
257. E.g., State ex rel. Christian D. Tompras v. Board of Election Commissioners of St. Louis
County, 136 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. Banc. 2004); Gallant v. LaFrance, 101 R.I. 299 (1966); Marchioro v.
Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298 (1978).
258. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 309 ("We have found no case or any literature which suggests
mandated equality by statute would violate the equal rights amendment.").
259. See id.
260. Id. at 305.
261. Id. at 306.
262. Id.
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statute which mandates equality by invoking a provision of the
constitution passed to guarantee equality.
263
As this paragraph makes clear, two decades before the French feminists of the
1990s fully developed their vision of equality as gender parity, the Washington
Supreme Court envisioned "absolute equality" and "equality of numbers,"
particularly in leadership positions for a major political party, as central to the
vision of equality of rights guaranteed by the ERA. It went on to distinguish a
rule requiring an equal number of men and women from "special exemptions or
exceptions because of sex, e.g. 'protective' labor legislation applicable to women
only., 264 Such rules were problematic because they were "exclusionary statutes
which apply to one sex only,' 265 unlike the gender quota at issue here.
The Washington Supreme Court also noted that, while sixteen states at the
time had state ERAs, only the state of Washington used the phrase "equality of
rights and responsibility., 266 The Court continued, "we must presume the
legislature and the people did not intend the phrase to be mere surplusage but
that it was to have meaning." 267 The gender quota ensured that men and women
exercised equal responsibility on state political party committees. By focusing
on responsibility rather than rights, the legitimacy of the statute is tied up with
its creating an opportunity for equal representation in a democratic process,
which must coexist with litigants' equal rights to compete for a position. The
Washington Supreme Court's construction of the ERA resonates, as we shall see,
with German and French constitutional interpretations of sex equality clauses as
legitimizing principles rather than enforceable rights.
C. The Significance of Constitutional Commitment
State laws imposing gender representation rules for political party
committees are an example of state legislative activity undertaken to enforce and
realize the potential of the federal Nineteenth Amendment. They proliferated
around the time that the first ERA was introduced in 1923, on the heels of the
Nineteenth Amendment. Today, American states are adopting policies
appropriate to post-industrial economies, which depend on people of all genders
to perform market work and raise children at the same time. These emerging
policies are not framed in terms of constitutional equality for women. But they
should be.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 307.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 307 (citing WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972)).
267. Id. at 307-08.
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Many of the states that are leading the way do have ERAs in their state
constitutions. While thirty-five states ratified the federal ERA, twenty-three
states now have ERAs in their state constitutions.
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Injecting a story of constitutionalism into states' efforts to reduce post-
industrial gender inequality can reframe these policies as a deliberately designed
framework rather than the convergence of contingent political interests at a
particular moment. Constitutionalizing a commitment to eradicating women's
sex-based disadvantages can connect the dots in the newly emerging social
reproduction paradigm. As a practical matter, it is clear that some degree of
institutional coordination is required among the different elements of the
infrastructure. The length of paid parental leave depends on the age at which
public childcare becomes available, and the extent and desirability of flexible
work arrangements also depend on the length of the school day. Understanding
these components as comprising a constitutional infrastructure for social
reproduction might prevent courts from striking down individual components
based on the constitutional rights claims of individual complainants.
The potential for such challenges is illustrated by the German parental leave
cases. The 1994 amendment on the actual implementation of equality between
women and men enabled the Constitutional Court to defend the measures
intended to incentivize fathers to take parental leave against individual litigants'
constitutional disparate impact and family autonomy claims. Even if we do not
adopt such strong interventions in the United States as a matter of policy, the
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Equal Protection claims of men and women adversely affected by the policy
should not be a barrier to doing so. We can easily see how application of strict
scrutiny or disparate impact antidiscrimination constructions of ERAs would
strengthen challenges to patemity leave incentives or gender balance initiatives.
If the law nudges fathers to do more caregiving through different legal
consequences for mothers and fathers taking leave, it would be unfortunate if
ERAs made such incentives harder rather than easier. Moving ERAs away from
antidiscrimination and towards the infrastructure of social reproduction would
avoid this situation.
If we rethink an ERA as a directive to create an infrastructure of social
reproduction that is compatible with all genders participating equally in both the
private and public spheres, state constitutional law is a good place to start. State
constitutional law is more amenable to the infrastructure of social reproduction
for several reasons. First, as a practical matter, the states are already leading in
adopting pregnancy accommodations, paid parental leave, universal preschool,
workplace flexibility, and gender quotas. Second, the infrastructure of social
reproduction involves positive rights, such as paid parental leave and early
childhood education. Our state constitutions have a tradition of positive rights,
such as the right to education, which is missing from the federal Constitution.
268
Education, the right to which is enshrined in every state constitution, is an
extremely important channel of social reproduction already. In addition, states
have always been open to comparativism in interpreting their constitutions.
When they look to other states, it is with the understanding that they are separate
sovereigns looking for similarities and guidance. In this mindset, it would not be
a huge shift or compromise in sovereignty for state courts to learn from
constitutions outside the United States.
In both Germany and France, it is clear that the recent amendments
conceptualize "actual implementation" of equality between men and women as
a normative principle or goal rather than an enforceable right held by individuals.
As such, the equality amendments are enablers rather than constrainers of state
action.269 By authorizing and legitimizing state action to pursue "actual
implementation of equal rights" or "equal access," the function of these
amendments is to clarify the relationship of gender equality policies to other
constitutional values. The German parental leave cases illustrate how the
268. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013); Robert F. Williams, Rights, in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006);
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1999). Zackin writes, "Americans have a long tradition of enshrining positive rights
in constitutions, but ... we must look at state constitutional politics to find them." ZACKIN, supra, at 11.
269. "[C]onstitutional rights norms do not simply contain defensive rights of the individual against
the state, but at the same time they embody an objective order of values, which applies to all areas of law
as a basic constitutional decision, and which provides guidelines and impulses for the legislature,
administration, and the judiciary." Alexy, supra note 143, at 352 (citing BVerfGE 39, 1 (41)).
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amendment provides a concrete constitutional command that must be balanced
against the individual claim of equal treatment and family autonomy. The
legislature, rather than courts, has primary responsibility for enforcing the
constitution.
270
Translated into U.S. Equal Protection analysis, the German constitutional
text and construction of "actual implementation of equal rights" forms what
American courts could embrace as the compelling state interest, which would
overcome the individual rights violation presumed to occur through the use of
sex classifications or generalizations about the likely behavior of men and
women. The jurisprudence of many European courts, including the German
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, has developed a
proportionality analysis in balancing constitutional principles against
constitutional rights. 2 7 1 On this understanding of the ERA, the amendment's
primary contribution to existing law would be to limit the scope of individual
rights claims, especially those premised on equal protection, rather than to
enlarge them. To mobilize the institutional coordination required to build a
gender-equal infrastructure of social reproduction, it will be necessary to limit
individual rights claims against sex-based affirmative action and state attempts
to reshape the roles of men and women in the family. As the European examples
illustrate, public policy schemes that actually incentivize gender role reversals at
home and at work sometimes require parental leave policies designed with
fathers' likely behavior in mind and workplace policies designed with mothers'
likely behavior in mind. This may best be done in gender-neutral terms, but in
some cases, gender-conscious policy might be more effective. The Constitution
should not prohibit the latter possibility, and a twenty-first-century ERA would
provide a doctrinal framework by which the rights claim to gender neutrality
could be balanced against the goal of restructuring social reproduction for a
world of gender equality. This conception would expand legislative authority
under the ERA to respond to ERA proponents' critique of existing Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five jurisprudence.
The Oregon and Washington ERAs explicitly authorize the state legislatures
to enforce the guarantee of equal rights. State legislatures contemplating
legislation on pregnant worker fairness, paid parental leave, childcare, workplace
flexibility, or gender balance should present such initiatives as enforcements of
constitutional equality. Recall that the new ERA text authorizes Congress and
270. Legislative enforcement of the constitution also occurs in the United States, although it is less
formally recognized. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111-39 (2008); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1980-2020 (2003); Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
271. See Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence,
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383 (2007); Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124
YALE L.J. 3095 (2015).
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the states to enforce the federal ERA. If all of the state efforts to build a new
infrastructure of social reproduction are explicitly understood to enforce state or
federal constitutional equal rights, the ERA can play an important role in
overcoming individual antidiscrimination challenges to equality policy.
D. Towards a New Constitutional Consensus
Even before the ERA was officially pronounced dead, Betty Friedan wrote
• • • 272
in The Second Stage that the family should be the new feminist frontier. She
called for a renewed focus on remaking the private and public arrangements that
worked against full lives with children for both men and women.27 3 Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's 1970s advocacy, which shaped Equal Protection sex discrimination
jurisprudence, was largely driven by her view that women's entry into the public
sphere would have to be supported by men's increased role in the home.
27 4
Proponents of a reintroduced ERA in the mid-1980s also embraced policies
beyond non-discrimination that would help women achieve real equality,
including childcare. 27 5  Legal feminists began to innovate within
antidiscrimination law to remedy disadvantages experienced by mothers in the
workplace.276 Since the 1990s, courts have increasingly recognized employers'
,. • • . 277
adverse actions against mothers as sex discrimination, and, in 2007, the EEOC
issued guidelines detailing the circumstances under which discrimination against
,. • • .. 278
caregivers constituted sex discrimination. When men or women were
adversely treated at work because of their caregiving responsibilities, the EEOC
guidelines established that such actions were premised on gender stereotypes.
Title VII plaintiffs who allege "family responsibilities discrimination" tend to be
more successful than other employment discrimination plaintiffs.2 79
272. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE 70-111 (1981).
273. See id. at 3-30.
274. As Cary Franklin has detailed, Justice Ginsburg's vision of equalizing roles both at work and
at home was largely inspired by Swedish feminism of the period. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping
Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 98-105 (2010).
275. See Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution
of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223, 1233 (2009).
276. See WILLIAMS, supra note 248.
277. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Wellpoint, 561 F.3d 38, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th
Cir. 1999).
278. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2007); see also U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EMPLOYER BEST PRACTICES FOR WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES (2009).
279. MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES, CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW 2
(2006), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf.
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The politics that defeated the ERA in the 1970s and early 1980s2" have
shifted considerably in the last thirty years. In that era, Phyllis Schlafly
convinced many women, mainly homemakers, that their roles as mothers and
caregivers would be demeaned as a result of a constitutional agenda that
encouraged women to participate more actively in the economic sphere.
281
Today, the economic reality has shifted, such that most women, including
mothers, cannot afford to refrain from participation in the economic sphere in
advanced democracies. Most mothers with school-age children are in the
workforce. Families depend on the incomes of both parents to meet their basic
needs. 282 There are more two-paycheck households in the twenty-first century
than there were male-breadwinner households in 1970.283 The rise of single-
parent families also makes it more common that a full-time worker is not
supported by a full-time homemaker.
Today, mothers' groups are advocating for public policies that would protect
motherhood, but they do so from the premise that most mothers must work.
284
Many of these groups focus on policies that would make it easier to combine
family caregiving and market work. These organizations include Moms Rising,
Mothers of Preschoolers (MOPS), Mothers & More, Mocha Moms, and Mom-
mentum. 285 These groups advocate for maternity and paternity leave, flexible
work arrangements, education and childcare, fair wages, universal healthcare,
toxin-free environments, paid sick days, gun control, healthy school foods, and
immigration fairness. 286 These mothers might have been attracted to Phyllis
Schlafly's STOP ERA campaign in the 1970s, as Schlafly claimed that the right
to raise one's children was "the most precious and important right of all. 287 In
organizing homemakers against the ERA, Schlafly aroused fears that the legal
guarantee of women's equality would lead to a denigration of women's role in
family caregiving, as well as its eventual abandonment. Today, women's
280. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE
AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); JOAN HOFF-WILSON, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF THE ERA (1986); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); GILBERT Y.
STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
(1985).
281. See Phyllis Schlafly, What's Wrong with 'Equal Rights'for Women?, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
REPORT 5, no. 7 (Feb. 1972).
282. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 35, at 8.
283. See KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: How A NEW GENERATION IS
RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA 4 (2010). Gerson's book provides a qualitative
study of the experiences of families with single, two-paycheck, and same-sex parents.
284. See generally THE 21 IT CENTURY MOTHERHOOD MOVEMENT: MOTHERS SPEAK OUT ON WHY
WE NEED TO CHANGE THE WORLD AND How To DO IT (Andrea 0. Reilly ed., 2011).
285. For a study of how motherhood organizations are forming a social movement in favor of better
work-family reconciliation, see JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, MOTHERS UNITE! ORGANIZING FOR
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LIFE (2013). See also THE 21' T
CENTURY MOTHERHOOD MOVEMENT, supra note 284.
286. JOAN BLADES & KRISTIN ROWE-FINKBEINER, THE MOTHERHOOD MANIFESTO: WHAT
AMERICA'S MOMS WANT - AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT loc. 76 (2006) (ebook).
287. Schlafly,supra note 281.
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participation in the workplace is not merely a choice made for the luxurious goals
of women's self-fulfillment, but a necessity for twenty-first-century families
raising children. As the Motherhood Manifesto puts it, "We have a twenty-first-
century economy stuck with an outdated industrial-era family support
structure. ' '288 Anne-Marie Slaughter sparked a national conversation after her
2012 article, Why Women Still Can't Have It All,289 confessed that the pull of
motherhood led her to quit a high-powered job at the State Department.
New bipartisan political coalitions are forming around each component of
the infrastructure of social reproduction. There is bipartisan support for pregnant
workers' accommodations. In UPS v. Young, a coalition of conservative pro-life
groups filed an amicus brief in favor of Peggy Young, arguing that the failure to
accommodate pregnant women in the workplace encouraged pregnant women toS 290
seek abortions. Republican legislators are also now cosponsors of the Pregnant
Worker Fairness Act in Congress. Forty-five states-more states than required
for a constitutional amendment-now offer some form of public preschool. The
states with the highest levels of support and participation (Florida, Georgia, and
Oklahoma) did not ratify the ERA in the 1970s and 1980s. But a new framing of
constitutional sex equality as the infrastructure for social reproduction that
supports mothers and children can alter the political coalitions in the states.
CONCLUSION
If we begin to view global sex equality constitutionalism as establishing a
sustainable twenty-first-century framework for social reproduction, and state
work-family life policies as having constitutional significance, a new paradigm
of constitutional sex equality can emerge. The new paradigm would not focus on
enabling individuals to transcend the constraints of gender as a category. Nor
would it be about advancing women. The new paradigm would simply recognize
the need to bring our political, economic and social institutions up-to-date with
how twenty-first-century people of all genders live, work, and raise the next
generation.
As currently construed, the de facto ERA of equal protection sex equality
jurisprudence liberates women and men from confining stereotypes. American
constitutional sex equality is now primarily concerned with appreciating the
freely chosen traits of individuals. Because gender categories interfere with this
goal, our existing law of gender equality is hostile to gender quotas, even while
feminists acknowledge the value of greater gender balance in powerful
institutions. Similarly, it is becoming increasingly central to our law of gender
288. BLADES & ROWE-FINKBEINER, supra note 286, at 76.
289. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can't Have It All, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/201 2/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/.
290. Brief for 23 Pro-Life Organizations and the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae
supporting Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Service, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226).
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equality that no individual person be treated unequally because of his or her
chosen gender identity. Thus, lately, our gender equality talk focuses on
bathrooms and the importance of not excluding transgender individuals from the
bathroom that serves persons sharing their chosen gender identities.
This individual freedom-based account of gender equality is not wrong; it is
morally compelling and should remain the focus of Equal Protection and
antidiscrimination law. But this understanding is different from (though usually
compatible with) the purpose and paradigm of gender equality that should form
the basis of a new constitutional amendment. To add something that we don't
already have, and that all Americans need, a new ERA should take social
reproduction, rather than the problem of individual freedom from discrimination,
as its core concern. The primary purpose of guaranteeing real sex equality is to
ensure that the next generation of citizens can be raised without depending on an
obsolete social arrangement that no longer works: the male breadwinner-female
caregiver family. A twenty-first-century ERA could serve as the foundation for
collective efforts to complete the revolution in the way Americans work,
reproduce, and raise the next generation in the post-industrial age. These efforts
need not take the form of gender quotas or generous maternity protections, as
they have in Europe. But whatever the focus is for the new social reproduction
infrastructure that is largely emerging in the states, courts could rely on a federal
or state ERA to uphold the infrastructure if challenged by individuals
complaining of discrimination or due process liberty violations. Imagining a new
ERA operating in this way can transform our assumptions of what our
Constitution can and should do.
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